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RECONCEPTUALIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR
OFFENDERS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS
E. Lea Johnston*
Abstract
Roughly 14% of male inmates and 31% of female inmates suffer from
one or more serious mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and major depressive disorder. Policymakers and the public
widely ascribe the overrepresentation of offenders with serious mental
illness in the justice system to the “criminalization” of the symptoms of
this afflicted population. The criminalization theory posits that the
criminal justice system has served as the primary agent of social control
over symptomatic individuals since the closure of state psychiatric
hospitals in the 1950s and the tightening of civil commitment laws. The
theory identifies untreated mental illness as the origin of individuals’
criminal justice involvement and mental health treatment as the clear
solution to breaking their cycle of recidivism. This Article evaluates the
three main bodies of evidence offered in support of the criminalization
theory: individuals’ movement from psychiatric hospitals to jails and
prisons (“transinstitutionalization”), the heightened policing of
individuals with serious mental illness, and the science linking mental
illness and crime. This evaluation reveals that the criminalization
theory—the understanding that animates most current policies aimed at
offenders with serious mental illness—rests largely on intuitive
assumptions that are often unverified and sometimes false.
A growing body of behavioral sciences literature constructs an
alternative account of the relationship between mental illness and crime.
Coined the “normalization theory,” it relies upon decades of research that
demonstrate that clinical factors, such as diagnosis and treatment history,
are not predictive of criminal activity. Instead, the same risks and needs
that motivate individuals without mental illness also drive those with
mental disorders to commit crimes. These “criminogenic risks” include,
among others, substance abuse, employment instability, family problems,
and poorly structured leisure time. Behavioral science researchers reject
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the premise that individuals with serious mental illness are
overrepresented in the justice system because these individuals’ illnesses
directly lead to criminal behavior. Instead, they theorize that serious
mental illnesses fuel the greater accumulation and concentration of
typical criminogenic risk factors.
This recognition holds dramatic potential for the redesign of criminal
justice programs. Programs that target the criminal behavior of offenders
with mental illness should principally focus on addressing criminogenic
risk factors that can be mitigated. Officials should also address mental
health needs, but only to the extent necessary to facilitate a better
criminogenic risk profile and fulfill constitutional obligations. Moreover,
correctional experience suggests that institutions should allocate their
scarce programmatic resources according to offenders’ risk of
reoffending and potential to achieve programmatic goals. These insights,
which federal agencies are beginning to recognize, hold radical
implications for the redesign—and possibly the existence—of jail
diversion programs, mental health courts, specialized probation and
parole, and reentry programs for offenders with serious mental illness.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between mental illness and criminal behavior is
elusive and complex. Understanding this relationship is key to the design
of effective interventions for offenders with serious mental illness. The
efficient allocation of scarce correctional and community resources
depends on an accurate understanding of whether, and to what extent, the
relationship between mental illness and crime is direct or is mediated by
other variables.1 Indeed, such an understanding will be critical for
eradicating stigma related to mental illness and, ultimately, for ending
mass incarceration.
Reducing the involvement of individuals with serious mental illness
in the criminal justice system is of paramount importance. Prevalence
estimates vary, but researchers estimate that roughly 14% of male
inmates and as many as 31% of female inmates suffer from one or more
serious mental illnesses,2 such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and
major depressive disorder.3 These rates are two to three times higher than
those of the general population.4 Inmates with serious mental illness are
1. See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness:
Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 118–19
(2011).
2. See FRED OSHER ET AL., ADULTS WITH BEHAVIORAL HEALTH NEEDS UNDER
CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION: A SHARED FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND PROMOTING
RECOVERY 3–4 (2012), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSG_Behavioral_Framework.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RY6W-3HLQ]. The concern in this Article is individuals with serious mental
illness who are involved in the criminal justice process. The term “serious mental illness” is used
in this Article to refer to mental disorders, other than substance abuse disorder, that satisfy criteria
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revised, have
lasted for at least a year, and are related to a significant functional impairment. Id. at 3 (adopting
this definition).
3. HOLLY HILLS ET AL., EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: GUIDELINES TO
EXPAND AND IMPROVE TREATMENT 3 (2004), https://info.nicic.gov/nicrp/system/files/018604.pdf
[https://perma.cc/989J-6BTK] (discussing the prevalence of mental illness in prison systems);
Kenneth Adams & Joseph Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 913, 913 (2008) (discussing studies about the prevalence of mental illness in state and
federal prisons); Matthew W. Epperson et al., Envisioning the Next Generation of Behavioral
Health and Criminal Justice Interventions, 37 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 427, 428 (2014); Henry
J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 761, 764 (2009) (discussing the prevalence of serious mental illness among jail inmates).
4. See Nahama Broner et al., Effects of Diversion on Adults with Co-Occurring Mental
Illness and Substance Use: Outcomes from a National Multi-Site Study, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 519,
519 (2004); see also Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Serious Mental
Illness (SMI) in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), in MENTAL HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2004, at 134, 137 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Joyce T. Berry eds., 2006)
(referring to women); Linda A. Teplin, The Prevalence of Severe Mental Disorder Among Male
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significantly more costly to house and treat than those without mental
illness for a variety of reasons, including increased staffing needs,
psychiatric medications, and psychiatric evaluations.5 Some studies have
found that offenders with serious mental illness have higher rates of
recidivism6 and probation revocation7 than those without such illness.8
The likelihood of recidivism is even higher for the majority of offenders
with serious mental illness who have co-occurring substance abuse
disorders.9 Moreover, jails and prisons are ill-equipped to safely house
Urban Jail Detainees: Comparison with the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program, 80 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 663, 663 (1990) (referring to men).
5. See OSHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL
PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 9–10 (2010); infra
note 291 and accompanying text.
6. See Jacques Baillargeon et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Repeat Incarcerations: The
Revolving Prison Door, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 103, 105 (2009) [hereinafter Baillargeon et al.,
Psychiatric Disorders]; Kristin G. Cloyes et al., Time to Prison Return for Offenders with Serious
Mental Illness Released from Prison: A Survival Analysis, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 175, 183
(2010). However, “[a] number of studies have shown that inmates with mental disorders exhibit
reincarceration rates that are either comparable to or lower than rates for inmates without
psychiatric disorders.” Jacques Baillargeon et al., Parole Revocation Among Prison Inmates with
Psychiatric and Substance Use Disorders, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1516, 1516–17 (2009)
[hereinafter Baillargeon et al., Parole Revocation] (endnotes omitted) (collecting studies).
7. See Jennifer Eno Louden et al., Applying the Sequential Intercept Model to Reduce
Recidivism Among Probationers and Parolees with Mental Illness, in THE SEQUENTIAL INTERCEPT
MODEL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROMOTING COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH
SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 118, 120 (Patricia A. Griffin et al. eds., 2015) (summarizing studies);
Jennifer L. Skeem & Jennifer Eno Louden, Toward Evidence-Based Practice for Probationers
and Parolees Mandated to Mental Health Treatment, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 333, 333 (2006)
(citing research showing that the revocation of probation was much more likely for probationers
with mental illness than those without mental illness (37% versus 24%), as was rearrest (54%
versus 30%)); see also Frank J. Porporino & Laurence L. Motiuk, The Prison Careers of Mentally
Disordered Offenders, 18 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 29, 40–41 (1995) (finding, in a study of
seventy-two Canadian parolees, that those with a major mental illness were more likely to be
reincarcerated for parole violations but less likely to be reincarcerated for committing a new
criminal offense than parolees without such a condition). But see Baillargeon et al., Parole
Revocation, supra note 6, at 1516 (finding that neither parolees with a psychotic nor a major mood
disorder had a statistically significant increased risk of parole revocation for a technical violation
or commission of a new offense than non-disordered parolees).
8. See Baillargeon et al., Parole Revocation, supra note 6, at 1519 (discussing possible
contributors to high reincarceration rates).
9. See, e.g., DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISONS AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006) (finding that 74% of state prisoners
with mental illness and 76% of local jail inmates with mental illness “met criteria for substance
dependence or abuse”); Baillargeon et al., Parole Revocation, supra note 6, at 1519 (finding that
parolees with comorbid serious mental illness and substance abuse disorders were nearly twice as
likely to experience revocation as a result of a parole violation than offenders with only a serious
mental illness); Stephanie W. Hartwell, Comparison of Offenders with Mental Illness Only and
Offenders with Dual Diagnoses, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 145, 145 (2004) (finding that released
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and care for these inmates.10 This inadequacy can result in the
victimization of inmates, the deterioration of their mental health, and
costly lawsuits alleging violations of inmates’ Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.11 Therefore, correctly
identifying the origin of this population’s offending behavior—and, more
importantly, understanding how to reduce it—is crucial to decreasing the
use of incarceration, bringing correctional costs under control, and
addressing a growing humanitarian crisis.
The legal community generally assumes that mental illness drives
criminal behavior and that the provision of mental health treatment will
reduce recidivism.12 These beliefs are an outgrowth of the popular
criminalization theory, which posits that individuals with serious mental
illness have become enmeshed in the criminal justice system because the
mental health system has failed.13 According to this theory, the closure of
psychiatric hospitals released a flood of individuals with mental illness
into communities.14 Without adequate community treatment or broad
civil commitment laws, these individuals were then arrested for behavior
inmates with dual diagnoses had higher rates of reincarceration than inmates with severe mental
illness alone).
10. See E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing: The Case of Seriously
Disordered Offenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 630–36 (2014) (detailing shortcomings in mental
screening procedures); E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing
and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 158–83 (2013) [hereinafter Johnston,
Vulnerability] (discussing the likelihood of physical and sexual assaults, housing in solitary
confinement, and psychological deterioration during incarceration).
11. See, e.g., Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (finding that
the Alabama Department of Corrections and the Associate Commissioner of Health Services
violated an individual’s Eighth Amendment right regarding accommodation for serious mentalhealth needs); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that
plaintiffs must show a sufficiently serious injury and satisfy the subjective component of the
Eighth Amendment in order to show a violation of objective Eighth Amendment standards).
12. See, e.g., Risdon N. Slate, Deinstitutionalization, Criminalization of Mental Illness, and
the Principle of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 341, 354 (2017) (“Ideally,
if appropriate and sufficient treatment were available in the community, there would be no need
to have protocols in place to divert persons with mental illnesses from the criminal justice
system.”); Chris Gautz, Mental Health Court a Year Old, JACKSON CITIZEN PATRIOT (MI), Nov.
14, 2009, at A1 (quoting the judge of the mental health court in Jackson County, Michigan, as
explaining that mental health courts provide treatment to offenders with mental illness because
“[t]hey’re just going to recidivate if you don’t address the underlying pathology”); Kathleen Brady
Shea, Mental Health Courts on Horizon – Local Counties, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 30, 2008, at B1
(quoting Delaware County Court Judge Frank T. Hazel as expressing that offenders with mental
illness often reoffend because they do not receive adequate treatment for their mental illnesses).
13. See William H. Fisher et al., Beyond Criminalization: Toward a Criminologically
Informed Framework for Mental Health Policy and Services Research, 33 ADMIN. & POL’Y
MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. RES. 544, 546 (2006); see also infra Part I
(discussing the criminalization theory).
14. Fisher et al., supra note 13, at 545.
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deriving from their illnesses, either for violent crimes or for minor
offenses as a means of securing needed treatment or enforcing social
control.15 The implications of this theory are clear: symptomatic mental
illness is the root cause of these offenders’ criminal involvement, so
access to and participation in treatment should reduce recidivism. Most
current programs tailored to offenders with serious mental illness—
including jail diversion programs, mental health courts, specialized
probation and parole dockets, and reentry programs—emanate from this
theory of criminal behavior and center around the leveraged provision
of community treatment.16 Some direct evidence supports the
criminalization theory,17 and an older body of clinical literature has
contributed to its dominance.18
This account of the criminal justice involvement of individuals with
serious mental illness has yielded several effects. Positively, the narrative
has called national attention to the severe shortage of community mental
health resources and the need for an immediate and substantial influx of
funding.19 It has also revived useful conversations about the proper scope
of civil commitment laws and the important role of insurance in providing
and utilizing mental health care.20 Additionally, the account has sparked
outrage at the transformation of prisons and jails into “asylums,”21 and it
15. Id. at 545–46.
16. See Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 112 (“[C]riminal justice-derived programs for this
population are united by their emphasis on linkage with mental health services in the community
as an essential component of their mission.”); see also infra notes 33–38 and accompanying text
(discussing this theory).
17. See infra Part I.
18. See Sarah McCormick et al., Mental Health and Justice System Involvement: A
Conceptual Analysis of the Literature, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 213, 219 (2015) (exploring
the aims, implicit assumptions, scope, and terminology of the clinical literature concerning mental
health and criminal offending and comparing this to the independent and somewhat conflicting
approach to the same topic by the literature focused on forensic rehabilitation).
19. See, e.g., HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 23–25 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/ [https://perma.cc/
UA4Z-NQS3]; MILTON L. MACK, JR., CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINS.,
DECRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM 3, 9–10 (2017), http://cosca.
ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/2016-2017-Decriminalization-ofMental-Illness-Fixing-a-Broken-System.ashx [https://perma.cc/429K-UCF3]; Michele Nealon,
Decriminalizing Mental Illness, HUFFPOST (May 12, 2016, 6:51 PM), https://www.huffington
post.com/michele-nealonwoods/decriminalizing-mental-il_b_9913256.html [https://perma.cc/
XR3T-ZQUH].
20. See, e.g., Rachel A. Scherer, Toward a Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment Statute:
A Legal, Medical, and Policy Analysis of Preventive Outpatient Treatment, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
361, 413–15 (2007) (using evidence of criminalization to argue on behalf of preventative
outpatient treatment civil commitment).
21. See generally, e.g., ALISA ROTH, INSANE: AMERICA’S CRIMINAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL
ILLNESS (2018) (discussing this phenomenon).
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has prompted the funding and creation of diversion programs to shunt
individuals with mental illness out of the justice system and into
community treatment.22
However, the theory of criminalization has a dark underside. Most
importantly, the theory fuels a simplistic understanding of criminal
behavior—reminiscent of the “medical model” of rehabilitation dominant
until the 1970s23—that germinates from and reinforces false causal
associations between mental illness, violence, and crime. Moreover, the
premise that serious mental illness holds a direct, causal relationship to
crime is largely wrong, so policies based on this understanding are
destined to fail.24 This failure then further cements the false and damaging
stereotype that offenders with serious mental illness are incorrigible and
dangerous, necessarily dominated and defined by their illness, and
fundamentally different from the rest of us.25
Recently, social scientists have proposed an alternative theory to
account for the disproportionate justice involvement of individuals with
serious mental illness.26 Coined the “normalization hypothesis,” this
explanation understands the phenomenon as reflective of the greater
concentration of criminogenic risks and needs among this population.27
22. See, e.g., CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, DECRIMINALIZING MENTAL ILLNESS: DIVERSION FROM
JAIL TO TREATMENT 1 (2009), https://www.alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/dchs/adultservices/
DecriminalizingMI.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PFC-Y3TF] (discussing initiatives “to effectively
address the problem of incarcerating people for behaviors that resulted from a mental illness and
lack of access to treatment”); COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH FORENSIC
SERVS. & NAMI MASS., DECRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: A SNAPSHOT LOOK AT
DIVERSION MODELS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 2–9 (2011), https://namimass.org/wp-content/
uploads/DecriminalizationofMentalIllness-ASnapshotLookatDiversionModelsinMass.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MZC-TDDS] (describing mental health diversion efforts in Massachusetts);
TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT 1–2 (2016), http://www.treatment
advocacycenter.org/fixing-the-system/21st-century-cures-act [https://perma.cc/78NW-3QV3]
(praising the 21st Century Cures Act for its efforts to decriminalize mental illness); Epperson et
al., supra note 3, at 428–29 (discussing initiatives at the federal and state level).
23. See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 547–
51 (2012).
24. See Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 114.
25. See Fisher et al., supra note 13, at 549 (observing that the current practice of focusing
“almost exclusively on mental health problems and solutions . . . reinforces the label of ‘person
with mental illness’ as a ‘master status’—that status which above all others defines the
individual’s position within the mental health system, the criminal justice system and society in
general”).
26. See Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 116 (arguing that “[w]hat is needed to shape more
informative research and more effective interventions is an explicit conceptual framework that
looks beyond mental illness as the principal cause of and solution to the problem of criminal
justice involvement” and exploring plausible alternatives).
27. Nancy Wolff, Are Mental Health Courts Target Efficient?, 57 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
67, 68 (2018) (citing Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 116–17) (defining the “normalization
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Criminogenic risks and needs are factors empirically demonstrated to
predict criminal behavior, such as antisocial personality pattern,
substance abuse, employment instability, and family problems.28 Studies
demonstrate that these factors motivate the criminal activity of those with
and without mental disorders alike.29 In the majority of cases, the effect
of mental illness on criminal behavior appears to be “fully mediated” by
these general risk factors.30 The normalization theory thus suggests that
the overrepresentation of mentally disordered offenders is best addressed
by treating those criminogenic needs that are capable of change.31
Crucially, this theory dictates that, so long as the goal is to reduce
recidivism,32 the criminal justice system should only provide mental
health treatment to the extent necessary to allow for the effective
treatment of criminogenic needs and to comply with constitutional
obligations. Accepting this empirically informed framework has dramatic
implications for major programs for offenders with mental illness in the
United States. It would necessitate the reform of virtually all such
programs and may require that some be eliminated completely.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I critically
evaluates evidence underlying the criminalization theory. In particular, it
assesses evidence of individuals’ transinstitutionalization from
psychiatric hospitals to jails and prisons, the differential policing of
individuals with mental illness, and the direct relationship of mental
illness to criminal offending. This analysis suggests that the theory of
criminalization, while intuitive, lacks robust evidentiary support.
Drawing from behavioral sciences literature, Part II presents evidence
undergirding the normalization theory. This Part discusses the
importance of criminogenic needs in motivating criminal behavior and
how these needs contribute to the overrepresentation of individuals with
serious mental illness in the justice system. Part III explores the dominant
correctional model for assessment and treatment, the Risk-NeedResponsivity (RNR) model, to suggest how these insights might apply to
contemporary justice programs. It also chronicles the fledgling efforts to

hypothesis” as “offenders with mental illness are ‘normal’ in their criminal behavior insofar as
the same criminogenic risk factors that motivate offenders without mental illness also motivate
those with mental illness”).
28. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 27.
30. See Skeem et al., supra note 1.
31. “Criminogenic needs” are defined as dynamic risk factors for criminal behavior that,
consequently, should serve as intermediate targets of change in rehabilitation treatment. D. A.
Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 39, 45–46 (2010).
32. But see infra Subsection IV.B.2 (asking whether the criminal justice system should
expend resources in the pursuit of goals beyond public safety).
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apply this model to offenders with serious mental illness and shows that
substantial reform of specialized programs has yet to occur.
Part IV charts a new path forward. It argues that taking the
normalization hypothesis and the RNR model seriously calls for a radical
shift in the way the criminal justice system treats offenders with serious
mental illness. It posits that the four major programs specially designed
for these individuals—jail diversion programs, mental health courts,
specialized probation and parole, and community reentry—should be
abandoned unless a scientifically sound justification linked to public
safety can be offered for their existence. It then proposes four potential
justifications for these programs, all involving varying relationships
between mental illness, criminogenic risks, and recidivism. If none of
these justifications is availing, the correctional system should reallocate
its scarce resources to programs that achieve better programmatic
outcomes and focus on fulfilling its constitutional obligation to provide
reasonably adequate mental health care to all inmates in need.
I. CRIMINALIZATION THEORY
The core of criminalization theory is that faulty mental health policy
and inadequate service delivery have resulted in the inappropriate
involvement of persons with serious mental illness with the criminal
justice system.33 As the Council of State Governments stated in 2002:
Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, defenders, and
judges—people on the front lines every day—believe too
many people with mental illness become involved in the
criminal justice system because the mental health system has
somehow failed. They believe that if many of the people
with mental illness received the services they needed, they

33. See, e.g., Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental
Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143, 143
(2003) (“For most [offenders with mental illness], the underlying issue is their need for basic
services and supports that public systems have failed to deliver in meaningful ways.”); Fisher et
al., supra note 13, at 545–46 (discussing the evolution of the criminalization theory); H. Richard
Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review,
49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 483, 485 (1998) (“[M]any uncared-for mentally ill persons may be
arrested for minor criminal acts that are really manifestations of their illness, their lack of
treatment, and the lack of structure in their lives.”). Marc F. Abramson first suggested the
criminalization theory. See Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered
Behavior: Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 101, 104–05 (1972).
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would not end up under arrest, in jail, or facing charges in
court.34
Criminalization theory thus posits that mental illness lies at the root
of an offender’s criminal behavior and that with effective mental health
treatment, the criminal behavior will stop.35 Forensic psychologists,
criminologists, and legal scholars have argued that the criminalization
theory lacks a strong evidentiary basis.36 Recently, federal government
agencies have cautiously acknowledged this argument.37 However, this
theory continues to dominate public discourse and serves as the
underlying rationale for all major justice programs directed at people with
serious mental illness who are involved with the criminal justice
system.38
Criminalization proponents often make three assertions when
defending this theory: that individuals with serious mental illness
migrated to jails and prisons upon the closure of state mental hospitals,
that law enforcement officers arrest individuals with serious mental
illness at a higher rate than individuals without perceived illness in an
effort to provide needed treatment or to ease public discomfort, and that
individuals’ offenses are simply manifestations of their illnesses.39 Close
34. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT
26 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197103.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8G6-7GXU].
35. See id.; see also John Junginger et al., Effects of Serious Mental Illness and Substance
Abuse on Criminal Offenses, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 879, 879 (2006) (explaining that adherents
of the criminalization theory apparently believe that “symptoms of serious mental illness motivate
or otherwise cause actual criminal offenses”).
36. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 13, at 547–48 (marshalling evidence both in support
of and challenging the criminalization theory and concluding that the body of evidence is “at best
equivocal in its support of the ‘criminalization due to inadequate mental health services’ model”);
Junginger et al., supra note 35 (“In fact, what little empirical research exists on this particular
interpretation of the criminalization hypothesis has produced no consensus.”); Skeem et al., supra
note 1, at 116 (“There is no evidence for the basic criminalization premise that decreased
psychiatric services explain the disproportionate risk of incarceration for individuals with mental
illness.”). See generally Fredrick E. Vars & Shelby B. Calambokidis, From Hospitals to Prisons:
A New Explanation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 101 (2017) (critiquing modern criminalization
explanations and offering a novel one, based on involuntary medication of prisoners, to explain
the disproportionate incarceration of persons with mental illness).
37. See OSHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (“Recent studies . . . have demonstrated that the
relationship of mental illness to criminal activity is . . . nuanced and complex. . . . [C]hanges in
an individual’s psychiatric symptoms do not necessarily relate to whether or not he or she is
rearrested or revoked from community supervision.”).
38. Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Offenders with Mental Illness Have Criminogenic Needs, Too:
Toward Recidivism Reduction, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 212, 212 (2014) (“Most policy
recommendations for this population reflect an implicit assumption that mental illness is the direct
cause of criminal justice involvement, and psychiatric treatment is the principal solution . . . .”).
39. See infra Sections I.A–C. Another perceived contributor to criminalization has been the
narrowing of civil commitment laws, which has reduced the ability of law enforcement to forcibly
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examination demonstrates that these assertions, while certainly true in
some cases, do not individually or collectively explain the justice
involvement of most individuals with serious mental illness. Moreover,
they do not provide a sound prescription to end that involvement.
A. Transinstitutionalization
Advocates of criminalization theory contend that the phenomenon of
criminalization began with the closure of state-run psychiatric facilities
in the 1950s.40 According to this theory, deinstitutionalization—the
movement to treat individuals in the community rather than in
institutional settings—resulted in a deluge of patients into communities
with inadequate outpatient services and thereby led to a surge in apparent
deviant behavior.41 Narrower civil commitment laws and decreased
institutional capacity meant that mental hospitals exerted less authority
over these individuals.42 Instead, law enforcement officers became the
primary agents of social control.43 This account assumes a reciprocity and
functional interdependence between the mental health and criminal
justice systems whereby a decrease in capacity in one results in the
expanded use of the other for individuals requiring institutional care.44
Upon first glance, data seem to support this hypothesis.45 From the
1920s through the 1950s, the United States institutionalized those
deemed “mentally defective” at staggering rates. At the peak of
institutionalization in the 1940s and 1950s, the United States

treat symptomatic individuals in the civil mental health system. For a summary of the legal
evolution of civil commitment laws and the rise of due process protections for individuals facing
commitment, see generally Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The
American Experience, 43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCI. 209 (2006).
40. Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 111. For a detailed yet pithy recitation of the history of
deinstitutionalization, see CHRIS KOYANAGI, LEARNING FROM HISTORY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO LONG-TERM CARE REFORM 4–10 (2007),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7684.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZN6-749T].
41. See Henry J. Steadman et al., The Impact of State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalization
on United States Prison Populations, 1968-1978, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474, 475 (1984).
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43. See Abramson, supra note 33, at 102–03; Carole Morgan, Developing Mental Health
Services for Local Jails, 8 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 259, 261 (1981).
44. See generally L. S. Penrose, Mental Disease and Crime: Outline of a Comparative
Study of European Statistics, 18 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 1 (1939) (advancing the “balloon
theory”).
45. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the
Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 58–64 (2011)
(tracing the rise and fall of institutional populations over time).
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institutionalized approximately 625 of every 100,000 adults.46 From the
end of the 1950s through the 1980s, however, the rate of
institutionalization at mental hospitals dropped precipitously.47 After
1980, the population of individuals institutionalized at mental hospitals
dropped to “negligible” levels.48
As institutionalization rates fell dramatically, the national prison and
jail populations exploded. During the 1980s and 1990s, incarceration
rates increased by nearly 500%.49 Whereas the inpatient rate was
approximately three times the prison incarceration rate in the 1950s and
1960s, the inverse was true by the 1980s.50 Considering these trends,
commentators have speculated that deinstitutionalization resulted in the
migration of individuals with serious mental illness from psychiatric
hospitals to carceral facilities.51 Currently, levels of serious mental illness
are disproportionately high in carceral institutions,52 but it is unclear
whether this phenomenon is more acute now than it was in the past.53
Researchers have questioned the assumptions embedded in this
theory.54 In an early investigation of the reciprocity between the mental
health and criminal justice systems, Henry Steadman and his colleagues
46. See Bernard E. Harcourt, An Institutionalization Effect: The Impact of Mental
Hospitalization and Imprisonment on Homicide in the United States, 1934-2001, 40 J. LEGAL
STUD. 39, 41 (2011).
47. Id. The advent of Medicaid and Medicare, medical advances in symptom control, public
awareness and intolerance of the abuses within mental hospitals, and the 1963 Community Mental
Health Act all served to shift mental health treatment from institutional to community-based care.
See Dae-Young Kim, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization and Prison Population Growth: A
Critical Literature Review and Its Implications, 27 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 3, 4–5 (2014); Steven
Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the Deinstitutionalization of the
Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (2013).
48. Harcourt, supra note 46.
49. Raphael & Stoll, supra note 47, at 189.
50. See Harcourt, supra note 46, at 43 fig.2; Raphael & Stoll, supra note 47, at 188.
51. See, e.g., Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 33, at 484 (discussing the thesis advanced by
Penrose, supra note 44, “that a relatively stable number of persons are confined in any industrial
society” so, if either institutionalization or incarceration is reduced, the other will increase, and
surmising that deinstitutionalization has significantly contributed to the incarceration of
individuals with mental illness); Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The
Comparative Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794, 794 (1984) (collecting
sources).
52. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
53. Steadman et al., supra note 41, at 477 (“Unfortunately, there is no available reliable
baseline data from psychological interviews and tests on the prevalence of mental disorder in
prison populations for the period before the deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals.”); id. at 488
(“[T]he clientele of prisons, based on their state hospitalization histories, appeared not to be
appreciably more disordered in 1978 than in 1968 . . . .”).
54. See, e.g., Seth J. Prins, Does Transinstitutionalization Explain the Overrepresentation
of People with Serious Mental Illnesses in the Criminal Justice System?, 47 COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH J. 716, 717–19 (2011).
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observed that, “[a]lthough the census of state mental hospitals fell
dramatically between 1968 and 1978, the number of admissions declined
only slightly. . . . Almost as many persons were admitted . . .; they just
did not stay as long.”55 The development of effective antipsychotic
medications, including chlorpromazine (Thorazine), permitted outpatient
treatment for psychotic disorders and shorter inpatient stays.56 Thus—
although the identity of admitted individuals did not factor into Steadman
et al.’s analysis—it is possible that roughly the same number of
individuals were receiving institutional care before as during the period
of deinstitutionalization.
In addition, a number of scholars have noted that the advent of
Medicaid in 1965 incentivized states to transfer patients from mental
hospitals to general hospitals and nursing homes.57 The daily spending
for nursing home care was lower than for an inpatient stay in a mental
hospital, and, under Medicaid, states bore 100% of state mental hospital
costs but only 20% to 50% of the costs for care in a nursing home.58 This
economic reality carried predictable and swift effects: Between 1963 and
1969, the percentage of institutional care for elderly people with mental
disorders in nursing homes grew from 53% to almost 75%.59 When the
daily costs of general hospital psychiatric units were less than double
those of state hospitals, states had a similar incentive to shift mental
hospital patients to general hospitals.60 Thus, criminalization proponents’
assumption that exits from state mental hospitals resulted in entry to
communities’ streets is, at least for many individuals who required
55. Steadman et al., supra note 41, at 479 (“In 1968, there were 66,077 male admissions to
the six states’ mental hospitals; in 1978, there were still 60,161 male admissions.”); see also
Jeffrey L. Geller, The Last Half-Century of Psychiatric Services as Reflected in Psychiatric
Services, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 41, 45 (2000) (“Much of this decrease in the size of state
hospitals is attributable to shortening lengths of stay.”).
56. See Harcourt, supra note 45, at 65–66. However, studies show that the advent of
psychotropic drugs was not a significant contributor to deinstitutionalization. See Joni Lee Pow
et al., Deinstitutionalization of American Public Hospitals for the Mentally Ill Before and After
the Introduction of Antipsychotic Medications, 23 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 176, 185 (2015). See
generally William Gronfein, Psychotropic Drugs and the Origins of Deinstitutionalization, 32
SOC. PROBS. 437 (1985) (discussing the effects of psychotic drugs on institutionalization).
57. See, e.g., RICHARD G. FRANK & SHERRY A. GLIED, BETTER BUT NOT WELL: MENTAL
HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1950, at 54–55, 94–95 (2006); KOYANAGI, supra
note 40, at 1; Harcourt, supra note 45, at 67–68; Prins, supra note 54, at 717–18.
58. FRANK & GLIED, supra note 57, at 54.
59. Id. at 55; see also KOYANAGI, supra note 40, at 6 (“[B]y 1980, 750,000 people with
serious mental illness lived in nursing homes, representing 44 percent of the nursing home
population.”).
60. FRANK & GLIED, supra note 57, at 54; see KOYANAGI, supra note 40, at 6 (“General
hospitals more than doubled their psychiatric patient-care episodes from 1955 to 1977, as state
hospital use declined by 30 percent over the same time.”).
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institutionalized care, false. Moreover, while their populations began
winnowing decades before, whole state institutions did not begin to close
in significant numbers until the 1990s.61
Studies on deinstitutionalization’s effect on incarceration rates have
reached varying conclusions,62 but the most rigorous study to date has
found that transinstitutionalization accounts for perhaps a quarter of the
population of incarcerated individuals with severe mental illness.63 In a
2013 study using a panel data set, Professors Stephen Raphael and
Michael A. Stoll found that those who would have been institutionalized
in 1950 were much less likely to be institutionalized (in either mental
hospitals or prisons) in 2000, “both absolutely and relative to overall
trends.”64 They found no evidence of transinstitutionalization for any
demographic group between 1950 and 1980, the period when state-run
mental hospitals were closing.65 Nevertheless, between 1980 and 2000,
Raphael and Stoll found significant transinstitutionalization rates for men
and women, with the largest transinstitutionalization rate for white men.66
For nonwhite men after 1980, the effect of transinstitutionalization was
insignificant or absent altogether,67 a finding of increased significance in
light of the disproportionate incarceration rate of this population.68
Raphael and Stoll concluded that, for the year 2000, deinstitutionalization
may have accounted for between 14% to 26% of the incarcerated severely

61. KOYANAGI, supra note 40, at 1.
62. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 47, at 3–11 (reviewing empirical literature examining the
impact of mental hospitalization on imprisonment and concluding that, overall, empirical findings
are equivocal at the aggregate level); Ashley Primeau et al., Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally
Ill: Evidence for Transinstitutionalization from Psychiatric Hospitals to Penal Institutions, 2
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (2013) (finding that 7% of the changes in Pennsylvania’s
incarceration rate between 1970 and 2010 could be attributed to a decrease in hospital beds).
63. See Raphael & Stoll, supra note 47, at 192 (defining “severe mental illness” as including
“manic depression, bipolar disorder, or a psychotic disorder”).
64. Id. at 203.
65. Id. at 211–12; see also Steadman et al., supra note 41, at 483 (“During the period of
maximum deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals [between 1968 and 1978], the percentage of
former patients among the ranks of prison admittees decreased in as many study states as it
increased.”).
66. Raphael & Stoll, supra note 47, at 215–16 (finding a near one-for-one
transinstitutionalization rate for white men between 1980 and 2000).
67. Id. at 216.
68. Important demographic distinctions exist between formerly institutionalized individuals
and currently incarcerated people with serious mental illness. Fred Osher & Yu Ling Han, Jails
as Housing for Persons with Serious Mental Illnesses, 16 AM. JAILS 36, 38–39 (2002); Prins,
supra note 54, at 719. Whereas “prison and jail inmates in the United States are overwhelmingly
male, disproportionately minority, and relatively young,” Raphael & Stoll, supra note 47, at 198,
the mental hospital population at midcentury was considerably older and more likely to be white
and female. Id. at 200.
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ill population.69 As an explanation for the delayed effects of
transinstitutionalization, the authors hypothesized that “it is likely that
deinstitutionalization followed a chronologically selective path, with the
least ill and perhaps the least prone to felonious behavior
deinstitutionalized first.”70 However, Raphael and Stoll noted that they
could not control for changes in sentencing law and suspected such
changes to be a relevant factor in their analysis.71
Harsh drug laws and the frequent co-occurrence of mental disorder
and substance abuse likely account, at least partially, for the
disproportionate justice involvement of individuals with serious mental
illness.72 Legislatures imposed a number of severe sentencing policies in
the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, including three strikes, truth-insentencing, life without possibility of parole, and mandatory minimum
sentencing laws.73 The War on Drugs and “tough on crime” sentencing
policies increased incarceration rates for the entire population,74
including individuals with mental illness.75 Offenders with mental illness
have extremely high rates of substance abuse disorders, exceeding those
of the non-disordered offending population.76 Notably, studies have
found that, upon controlling for substance abuse, offenders with serious
mental illness are no more likely than offenders without psychiatric
illness to commit drug-related offenses.77 Thus, individuals’ involvement
in these offenses appears to be due to their substance abuse disorder, not
their serious mental illness. Moreover, system-level studies show that
neither the decrease of psychiatric inpatient capacity nor changes in the
69. Raphael & Stoll, supra note 47, at 219.
70. Id. at 209.
71. See id. at 217.
72. See Arthur J. Lurigio, People with Serious Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice
System: Causes, Consequences, and Correctives, 91 PRISON J. 66, 73–74 (2011).
73. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 73 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).
74. See Jon Sorenson & Don Stemen, The Effect of State Sentencing Policies on
Incarceration Rates, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 456, 456 (2002); Susan Turner et al., The Impact of
Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime
Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 77 (1999).
75. See Baillargeon et al., Psychiatric Disorders, supra note 6, at 103; Steven K. Hoge et
al., Outpatient Services for the Mentally Ill Involved in the Criminal Justice System, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N 1, 2 (2009); Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Mentally Ill Individuals
in Jails and Prisons, 46 CRIME & JUST. 231, 235–36 (2017).
76. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 9, at 6 (finding that 74% of state prisoners with a mental
problem met criteria for substance dependence or abuse, while 56% of those without a mental
problem did, and finding that 76% of jail inmates with a mental problem met criteria for substance
dependence or abuse, while 53% of those without a mental problem did).
77. See James A. Swartz & Arthur J. Lurigio, Serious Mental Illness and Arrest: The
Generalized Mediating Effect of Substance Use, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 581, 593 (2007).
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financing of community services affects the probability of incarceration
for individuals with mental illness.78 Researchers have concluded that
“there is little evidence that the risk of incarceration has uniquely
increased for those with mental illness.”79
B. Differential Policing
Criminalization proponents have also offered differential policing as
an explanation for the overrepresentation of offenders with serious
mental illness under correctional supervision. Police officers frequently
interact with persons who have serious mental illness: A 2000 study
found that 89% of officers in a large metropolitan center had contact with
such persons in the previous year.80 Commentators theorize that—in light
of a lack of community treatment options, bureaucratic hurdles to
emergency hospitalization, and narrow civil commitment criteria—
officers may opt to arrest individuals with mental illness for minor
offenses as a means of securing treatment, an act that has been called
“mercy booking.”81 Collections of case studies and anecdotal evidence
indicate the existence of this practice in certain localities.82 Given that
arrest for minor offenses is discretionary and somewhat arbitrary, 83 such
a tendency could result in the disproportionate arrest of individuals with
serious mental illness.
The primary support for differential policing as a systemic trend is a
1984 observational study by Professor Linda Teplin involving 1,382
police-citizen encounters.84 In observing 506 suspects—30 of whom had
78. Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 116; Fisher et al., supra note 13, at 547–48.
79. Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 116; see also FRANK & GLIED, supra note 57, at 124–28
(observing that, between 1990 and 2000, the share of people with mental illness in jails and prisons
rose, but the proportion of people with serious mental illness living with family or in the
community remained relatively stable at around 80% and arguing that, while incarceration rates
of people with serious mental illness have remained relatively stable, the share of incarcerated
people with mental illness has varied primarily with increases in the overall incarceration rate).
80. Teresa LaGrange, Distinguishing Between the Criminal and the “Crazy”: Decisions to
Arrest in Police Encounters with Mentally Disordered, Presentation at the American Society of
Criminology, San Francisco, California (Nov. 15–18, 2000); cf. Martha W. Deane et al., Emerging
Partnerships Between Mental Health and Law Enforcement, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 99, 100
(1999) (“Among the 174 police departments in our study, 7 percent of all police contacts, both
investigations and complaints, involved persons believed to be mentally ill.”).
81. Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 33, at 488; see Teplin, supra note 51, at 795.
82. See EDWIN FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE
ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 46–48 (1992).
83. See Robin Shepard Engel & Eric Silver, Policing Mentally Disordered Suspects: A
Reexamination of the Criminalization Hypothesis, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 225, 226 (2001).
84. Teplin, supra note 51. Proponents also point to the simple overrepresentation of
individuals with mental illness in jails and prisons and arrest rates of former mental patients. See
Engel & Silver, supra note 83, at 227–28. However, this evidence does not establish that law
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a mental illness—Teplin found that arrest rates for mentally disordered
suspects were 46.7% compared with 27.9% for non-mentally disordered
suspects.85 After disaggregating arrest rates by seriousness of offense,
Teplin concluded: “[W]ithin similar types of situations, persons
exhibiting signs of mental disorder have a higher probability of being
arrested than those who do not show such signs. Clearly, the way we treat
our mentally ill is criminal.”86 Subsequent research has found that several
clinical factors—including diagnosis, nature and severity of symptoms,
medication noncompliance, and impaired functioning—increase the
likelihood of arrest.87
However, researchers have found that once studies control for legally
relevant and encounter-level factors, clinical factors lose their salience,
and individuals with mental disorder are not more likely to be arrested
than their non-disordered counterparts.88 A 2001 study that used
multivariate statistical techniques to analyze data from two large-scale,
multi-site field studies of police behavior found that, after controlling for
variables known to affect police decision-making,89 police officers were
not more likely to arrest suspects with mental disorder.90 In addition, the
study found that the factors most relevant to arrest decisions for
individuals with mental disorder similarly predicted arrest for nondisordered individuals.91 Moreover, a 2005 observational study of 617
police-suspect encounters by Professors Kenneth J. Novak and Robin S.
Engel found that “mentally disordered suspects were . . . significantly less
enforcement officers are disproportionately or inappropriately arresting individuals with mental
disorders when they would not so treat non-disordered individuals.
85. Teplin, supra note 51, at 798.
86. Id. at 799.
87. See Ellen Ballard & Brent Teasdale, Reconsidering the Criminalization Debate: An
Examination of the Predictors of Arrest Among People with Major Mental Disorders, 27 CRIM.
JUST. POL’Y REV. 22, 25–26 (2016).
88. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. Prior research also reached this
conclusion. See Egon Bittner, Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally Ill
Persons, 14 SOC. PROBS. 278, 279 (1967); Jennifer Caldwell Bonovitz & Jay S. Bonovitz,
Diversion of the Mentally Ill into the Criminal Justice System: The Police Intervention
Perspective, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 973, 975–76 (1981).
89. The study factored in sex, race, age, homelessness, alcohol and drug use, disrespect to
officers, noncompliance with officers’ requests or commands, whether the victim knew the
suspect previously, whether the suspect was known to the police officer(s) prior to the encounter,
whether the victim(s) requested that police take official action, whether the encounter was
proactive or reactive, whether the location of the encounter was public or private, the number of
bystanders, suspect threat or assault of another citizen during the encounter, threat or assault of a
police officer during the encounter, evidence of disorderly or illegal conduct, presence of a
weapon, and the seriousness of the offense. Engel & Silver, supra note 83, at 237, 239 tbl.1.
90. Id. at 242, 245.
91. Id. at 242.
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likely to be arrested compared to non-disordered suspects,” even though
suspects with mental disorder “were significantly more likely to be
disrespectful” and to resist arrest than non-disordered suspects.92 These
authors surmised that officers are less likely to arrest individuals with
mental disorder because officers perceive them as less culpable and less
deserving of arrest.93 Additional research has confirmed that relevant
legal and situational factors—including nature and severity of offense,
prior criminal history, criminal thinking patterns, demeanor, intoxication,
public location of encounter, and victim requests for arrest—predict the
arrest of suspects both with and without mental illness.94
C. Symptom-Driven Crime
A fundamental assumption underlying the criminalization hypothesis
is that the criminal behavior of individuals with serious mental illness
stems from, or is a manifestation of, their illness.95 Criminalization
proponents believe that individuals with serious mental illness who
cannot access care in the community “are arrested for psychosis-induced
violence, disturbed behavior on the street, or ‘survival-type’ crimes (for
example, ‘dine and dash’ from a restaurant).”96 This notion is intuitive,
reflects the commonly held stigma that links mental disorders to
dangerousness, and reifies assumed differences between “mentally
disordered” and “normal” individuals. Importantly, it also suggests a
solution to end the cycling of individuals with mental disorder through
the criminal justice system: address the underlying cause of criminal
behavior by providing needed mental health treatment.

92. Kenneth J. Novak & Robin S. Engel, Disentangling the Influence of Suspects’
Demeanor and Mental Disorder on Arrest, 28 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT.
493, 506 (2005) (emphasis added). Prior research had established that, generally, these behaviors
increase likelihood of arrest. Id. at 494–95. This finding was replicated by Novak and Engel. Id.
at 506.
93. See id. at 507 (drawing upon a theory advanced in John Van Maanen, The Asshole, in
POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET 221, 223–24 (Peter K. Manning & John Van Maanen eds.,
1978)).
94. Ballard & Teasdale, supra note 87, at 27–28.
95. Jillian Peterson et al., Analyzing Offense Patterns as a Function of Mental Illness to
Test the Criminalization Hypothesis, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1217, 1217 (2010).
96. Id.
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However, research across jail,97 parole,98 and psychiatric samples99
demonstrates that only a small minority of crimes—perhaps around 5%
to 12%—committed by individuals with serious mental illness are the
direct result of delusions or hallucinations.100 An additional subset may
be motivated by anger, impulsivity, or confusion stemming from a serious
mood disorder.101 For example, in a 2014 study of 143 offenders with
mental illness, Professor Jillian Peterson and colleagues found that 4% of
crimes had a mostly or completely direct relationship to psychosis, 3%
had a mostly or completely direct relationship to depression, and 10%
had a mostly or completely direct relationship to bipolar disorder.102
Critically, the study authors employed broad definitions of mental illness
that included the possibly normative personality traits of anger and
impulsivity.103 Yet, even with these broad—and potentially
problematic—definitions of symptoms, only approximately one-fifth of
crimes had at least a “mostly . . . direct” relationship to symptoms.104
Approximately 82% of crimes were held to be completely (64.7%) or
mostly (17.2%) independent of offenders’ psychiatric illnesses.105 This
conclusion coheres with other research on the subject.106
Importantly, recent research has found that “there is no subgroup of
offenders with mental illness who only engage in criminal behavior when
their symptoms directly cause such behavior.”107 In the 2014 study by
97. See Junginger et al., supra note 35, at 880–81 (finding, in interviews of 113 offenders
with co-occurring mental and substance abuse disorders shortly after their arrest, that delusions
or hallucinations occurred concurrently with the index offense in 4% (n=4) of offenses).
98. See Peterson et al., supra note 95 (finding, in a retrospective study of 111 parolees with
a serious mental illness, that 7% of mentally disordered offenders’ criminal behavior was a direct
result of psychosis (5%, n=6) or constituted survival crimes related to poverty (2%, n=2)).
99. See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY
OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND VIOLENCE (2001) (finding, in a study of over 608 violent incidents
involving psychiatric patients, that psychosis immediately preceded violent incidents in 11%
(n=67) of violent and aggressive incidents detected).
100. See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Applicability of the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model to
Persons with Mental Illness Involved in the Criminal Justice System, 66 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 916,
919 (2015) (collecting studies).
101. See Junginger et al., supra note 35, at 880–81 (finding that 4% (n=4) of crimes were
related to “any other symptom-based influence, such as confusion, depression, thought disorder,
or irritability”); see also Jillian K. Peterson et. al., How Often and How Consistently Do Symptoms
Directly Precede Criminal Behavior Among Offenders with Mental Illness?, 38 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 439, 446 (2014).
102. Peterson et. al., supra note 101.
103. Id. at 440 (noting that categorizing anger and impulsivity as symptoms of mental illness
risks “pathologizing a normal emotional state”).
104. Id. at 446.
105. Id. at 444 fig.3.
106. See supra notes 97–99 (detailing studies).
107. Peterson et. al., supra note 101.
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Peterson and colleagues, “[t]he 18% of crimes coded as mostly or
completely related . . . to symptoms were scattered among 38% of
offenders” with mental illness.108 “Of the 38% of offenders with at least
one direct crime[] . . . [67%] also committed at least one crime that was
coded ‘mostly or completely’ independent” of symptoms.109 This finding
suggests that, if an offender is one who commits crimes reflecting her
psychiatric symptoms, over time she will also commit crimes unrelated
to her symptoms. Overall, the research suggests that many offenders with
serious mental illness commit no symptom-based offenses, while others
commit symptom-based crimes among other, more generally-motivated
crimes.
Indeed, decades of research have found that clinical factors are, at
most, weak predictors of criminal behavior. A landmark 1998 metaanalysis conducted by Dr. James Bonta, Professor Moira Law, and
Professor Karl Hanson found that the effect of clinical variables—such
as diagnosis, intellectual dysfunction, and treatment history110—on
recidivism111 was largely insignificant and paled in comparison to dozens
of other factors.112 The meta-analysis of 58 studies between 1959 and
1995 revealed that intellectual dysfunction, diagnosis of a mood disorder,
and treatment history were nonsignificant variables, while psychosis and
schizophrenia were negatively related to recidivism.113 Risk factors that
applied to offenders both with and without mental illness, such as
criminal history, juvenile delinquency, antisocial personality, family
problems, and substance abuse, were more predictive of criminal
behavior.114 The study’s authors concluded that many of the clinical
factors emphasized within the mental health community “have little
relevance to the assessment of long-term risk for recidivism.”115 In
subsequent work, Bonta and Professor D.A. Andrews identified major
mental disorder as a “minor” risk factor116 but posited that its predictive
108. Id. at 445.
109. Id.
110. James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally
Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 125 (1998).
111. Recidivism was defined as including “any evidence of a new criminal offence” (like an
arrest or conviction), “including a recommitment to a psychiatric hospital because of law-breaking
behavior.” Id. at 125–26.
112. See id. at 127–28 (general recidivism); see also id. at 132 (violent recidivism).
113. See id. at 128, 132, 136. These researchers found that major mental disorder was at least
unrelated to violent and nonviolent recidivism and, in some cases, may have even been negatively
associated with reoffending. See id. at 135, 136, 139.
114. See id. at 135–36.
115. Id. at 135; see also id. at 137 (“Clinical variables and clinical judgments contribute
minimally in the prediction of recidivism.”).
116. D.A. Andrews et al., The Recent Past and Near Future of Risk and/or Need Assessment,
52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 11 (2006).
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validity is mediated by the general risk factors of antisocial cognition and
antisocial personality pattern, as well as substance abuse.117
A large 2014 meta-analysis of the relative predictive validity of
general and clinical risk factors confirmed the insignificance of clinical
factors for recidivism.118 This meta-analysis of 126 studies representing
96 unique samples concluded that, “for offenders, having a mental
disorder was no more predictive of recidivism than not having a mental
disorder.”119 For both general120 and violent121 recidivism, the clinical
variables of psychosis, schizophrenia (which was analyzed separately due
to recent attention in the literature), mood disorder, prior admissions,
length of hospitalization, psychiatric treatment history, and personality
disorder were all insignificant predictors.122 The only exceptions were
antisocial personality and psychopathy, which were significant predictors
of both general and violent reoffending.123 This predictive relationship is
not surprising. Antisocial personality and psychopathy are closely
aligned with and include aspects of antisocial personality pattern (for
example, criminal history and personality features such as impulsivity,
hostility, and lack of empathy), which is a strong risk factor for criminal
activity in individuals with and without mental disorder.124
In summary, little hard evidence supports the criminalization
hypothesis. It is doubtlessly true that components of this theory—
including the closure of state psychiatric institutions, “mercy bookings,”
and arrests for symptomatic behavior—have contributed to the justice
involvement of some individuals with serious mental illness.125 However,
as a broad explanatory theory for the disproportionate justice
involvement of this population, the criminalization theory is unsupported
by strong evidence. Instead, the narrative seems reliant on uncritical and
stigma-driven assumptions involving the dominance of mental illness in
individuals’ lives and assumed causal connections between mental illness
and crime.

117. Id. at 10.
118. James Bonta et al., A Theoretically Informed Meta-Analysis of the Risk for General and
Violent Recidivism for Mentally Disordered Offenders, 19 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 278,
278 (2014).
119. Id. at 286. See generally id. at 281 (defining recidivism as any evidence of reoffending,
such as arrests or convictions, and including recommitment to a psychiatric facility due to a new
general or violent criminal offense).
120. Id. at 281 (defining general recidivism as any recidivism, including violent recidivism).
121. Id. (stating that violent recidivism includes sexual offenses).
122. See id. at 282, 285.
123. Id. at 285.
124. See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
125. TORREY ET AL., supra note 82, at 49.
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Crucially, the fact that insufficient treatment has contributed to a
population’s criminal justice involvement does not mean that adequate
treatment will reduce its overrepresentation. The behavioral sciences
literature documents a more complicated relationship between mental
health features and crime.
II. NORMALIZATION THEORY
Normalization theory identifies criminogenic needs, as opposed to
clinical factors, as driving criminal behavior.126 This theory hypothesizes
that “offenders with mental illness are ‘normal’ in their criminal behavior
insofar as the same criminogenic risk factors that motivate offenders
without mental illness also motivate those with mental illness.”127 Over
the last twenty years, researchers have identified eight criminogenic risk
and need factors—the “Central Eight”—that accurately and reliably
predict the risk of criminal behavior.128 The first four factors include a
history of antisocial behavior, antisocial personality pattern, antisocial
cognition, and antisocial attitudes.129 These variables involve poor
socialization, restless energy, risk-taking, impulsivity, egocentrism, poor
problem-solving skills, hostility, and a disregard for responsibilities and
others.130 The remaining four risk/need factors include marital or family
problems (or both), low levels of social or work performance (or both),
low levels of involvement and satisfaction in anti-criminal leisure
pursuits, and substance abuse.131 A number of studies, including largescale meta-analyses, have confirmed the importance of criminogenic risk
126. See Wolff, supra note 27, at 68. Earlier articles referred to the “normalization” theory
as the “criminality” theory. See generally Ballard & Teasdale, supra note 87, at 23–29 (describing
arguments advanced for the competing theories of criminalization and criminality). The
normalization approach is consistent with several criminological theories, including social
learning theory. See Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 116; see also infra notes 146–51 and
accompanying text (discussing social learning theory in the context of the RNR model).
127. Wolff, supra note 27 (citation omitted); see Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 116 (“[T]he
etiology of criminal behavior largely is shared by offenders with- and without-mental illness.”).
128. See Bonta et al., supra note 118, at 280, 282 (listing and discussing the predictive
validity of each criminogenic risk/need factor); see also JAMES BONTA & D.A. ANDREWS, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 45–46 tbl.3.1 (6th ed. 2017) (describing each factor in
detail).
129. Andrews et al., supra note 116. Early prediction studies found these four factors—
known colloquially as the “Big Four”—to be more predictive of criminal behavior than the four
remaining factors that comprise the “Central Eight” criminogenic risks/needs. See BONTA &
ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 44. Recent research, however, has found no clear demarcation in
the predictive weight of the eight factors for mentally disordered offenders, general offenders,
youthful offenders, mentally disordered offenders, racial minorities, or drug offenders. See id.
(listing studies).
130. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 45.
131. Andrews et al., supra note 116.
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factors in predicting recidivism among disordered and non-disordered
offenders alike.132 Clinical variables, such as diagnosis or treatment
history, do not improve predictive accuracy.133
Some research suggests that, on average, offenders with mental illness
enter the criminal justice system with a higher concentration of
criminogenic risk factors than offenders without mental illness. In a 2014
study assessing a matched sample of 221 parolees with and without
mental illness, Professor Jennifer Skeem and colleagues found that
offenders with mental illness had significantly higher scores for the
general risk factors of antisocial pattern, family or marital problems, low
educational or employment success, and procriminal attitude orientation
than their non-disordered counterparts.134 The largest difference in the
risk profiles of the two samples lay in antisocial personality pattern.135
Other studies have also found that offenders with mental illness tend to
be “riskier” than those without mental illness.136 The reasons for this
phenomenon are unclear, but contributing factors may be that individuals
with mental illness are more likely to live in poverty, be homeless, live
in disadvantaged neighborhoods, be victimized, and possibly have more
criminal associates.137
132. See, e.g., BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 44; Bonta et al., supra note 110, at
135; Bonta et al., supra note 118, at 282.
133. See Skeem et al., supra note 38; supra notes 110–23 and accompanying text.
134. See Skeem et al., supra note 38, at 218.
135. Id. at 221 (concluding that offenders with mental illness “were more likely to manifest
early and diverse criminal behavior, a generalized pattern of trouble (e.g., financial instability,
few prosocial friends), and procriminal attitudes” than their non-disordered counterparts).
136. See Lina Girard & J. Stephen Wormith, The Predictive Validity of the Level of Service
Inventory-Ontario Revision on General and Violent Recidivism Among Various Offender Groups,
31 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 150, 164 (2004) (finding, in a sample of 600 probationers, that those
with mental health problems (n=169) had significantly more general risk factors than those
without mental illness); Nancy Wolff et al., Thinking Styles and Emotional States of Male and
Female Prison Inmates by Mental Disorder Status, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1485, 1490–91 (2011)
(finding that inmates who reported a mental disorder scored significantly higher on measures of
aggression and hopelessness and showed antisocial attitudes similar to or greater than those who
did not report a mental disorder); infra notes 255–59 and text accompanying; cf. Robert D.
Morgan et al., Prevalence of Criminal Thinking Among State Prison Inmates with Serious Mental
Illness, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 324, 332 (2010) (finding that offenders with mental illness
exhibit criminal thinking patterns and content comparable to non-ill inmates).
137. See William H. Fisher et al., Community Mental Health Services and Criminal Justice
Involvement Among Persons with Mental Illness, in COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS 25, 38–41 (William H. Fisher ed., 2003)
(exploring the role of poverty and social environments as risk factors for criminal justice
involvement among persons with mental illness); Epperson et al., supra note 3, at 433–34
(identifying the tendency to move into high-crime neighborhoods with high levels of social and
economic disadvantage, poverty, under-education, unemployment, paucity of positive social
relationships, discrimination and stigma, and stress in meeting daily needs as exacerbating the
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Vitally important to calls for the adoption of the normalization theory
is evidence that demonstrates that all of the Central Eight criminogenic
risk factors—with the exception of established criminal history—are
dynamic or capable of change.138 Studies show that the most effective
programs for reducing recidivism are those that target these dynamic
risks.139 Evidence demonstrates that appropriate offender rehabilitation
programs that address criminogenic variables can reduce recidivism by
30%.140 In light of this evidence, Bonta and Andrews issued this opinion
in relation to programs directed at offenders with mental illness:
Our argument is that if [mental health] treatment services are
offered with the intention of reducing recidivism, changes
must be encouraged on criminogenic need factors. Offenders
also have a right to the highest quality service for other
needs, but that is not the focus of correctional rehabilitation.
Striving to change noncriminologic needs is unlikely to alter
future recidivism significantly unless it indirectly impacts on
a criminogenic need. We may make an offender feel better,
which is important and valued, but this may not necessarily
reduce recidivism.141
In summary, normalization theory holds, and empirical evidence
demonstrates, that reducing recidivism necessitates prioritizing the
criminogenic risk of individuals with serious mental illness); Fisher et al., supra note 13, at 552–
54 (discussing the impact of life circumstances and features of environments associated with
serious mental illness within criminological frameworks).
138. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 44, 46.
139. See, e.g., JAMES BONTA & D.A. ANDREWS, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL FOR
OFFENDER ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION 12 (2007) (concluding that, when the principles of
risk, need, and responsivity are followed in a rehabilitation program, “then we see average
recidivism differences between the treated and non-treated offenders of 17% when delivered in
residential/custodial settings and 35% when delivered in community settings”); Andrews &
Bonta, supra note 31, at 47–48 (summarizing the empirical base for the RNR model); Craig
Dowden & D.A. Andrews, Effective Correctional Treatment and Violent Reoffending: A MetaAnalysis, 42 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 459 (2000).
140. See Andrews & Bonta, supra note 31, at 47–48; Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, The
Importance of Staff Practice in Delivering Effective Correctional Treatment: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Core Correctional Practice, 48 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
203, 212 (2004); Craig Dowden et al., The Effectiveness of Relapse Prevention with Offenders: A
Meta-Analysis, 47 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 516, 522 (2003); A.
Murray Ferguson et al., Predicting Recidivism by Mentally Disordered Offenders Using the LSIR:SV, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 5, 8 (2009).
141. D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 244 (2d ed.
1998); see also Eric Silver, Understanding the Relationship Between Mental Disorder and
Violence: The Need for a Criminological Perspective, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 685, 689 (2006)
(“If mental disorder is only a small part of the problem, services aimed at its control can only be
a small part of the solution.”).
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treatment of criminogenic risk factors, not prioritizing the treatment of
the non-criminogenic factor of serious mental illness.
III. THEORY IN PRACTICE
Effective interventions for offenders with serious mental illness
require adopting a treatment framework that spans beyond mental health
to address the broader set of criminogenic needs proven to drive criminal
behavior.142 Recently, some social scientists and policy advocates have
suggested that the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model, a highly
influential correctional model that targets criminogenic needs and reflects
a normalization approach, should guide the treatment of this
population.143 This Part recounts the principles inherent in the RNR
model and elucidates current research regarding how mental illness may
factor into this framework. This Part then highlights the federal
government’s recent promotion of this model for justice-involved
individuals with mental illness and current efforts to apply the model to
this group.
A. Risk-Need-Responsivity Correctional Model
The RNR model is the leading evidence-based offender assessment
and treatment model in the world.144 In 1990, Andrews, Bonta, and
Professor Robert Hoge generated the first iteration of this model, which
is derived from a personality and social learning theory of criminal
behavior.145 A key premise of social learning theory is that criminal
behavior is learned through social interaction and operant
conditioning.146 According to one notable advocate of this theory,
142. See Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 116.
143. See, e.g., Carol Fisler, When Research Challenges Policy and Practice: Toward a New
Understanding of Mental Health Courts, 54 JUDGES J. 8, 11 (2015) (suggesting the RNR model
for mental health courts); Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 121; cf. Evan R. Seamone et. al., Veteran
Non Grata: Veteran Sex Offenders with Service-Related Mental Health Conditions and the Need
to Mitigate Risk, 6 VA. J. CRIM. L. 182, 221–23 (2018) (suggesting the application of the RNR
model to the treatment of sex offenders).
144. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 175.
145. See D.A. Andrews et al., Classification for Effective Rehabilitation: Rediscovering
Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 33 (1990); see also BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note
128, at 43–52 (outlining principles of general personality and cognitive social learning theory).
146. See Ronald L. Akers et al., Social Learning and Deviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a
General Theory, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 636, 637–38 (1979) (explaining core constituents of social
learning theory); Andrews & Bonta, supra note 31, at 44. Key elements of social learning theory
include differential association (group influence on behavior), definitions (an individual’s
attitudes and beliefs, learned and reinforced through differential association), differential
reinforcement (the balance of actual and anticipated consequences for engaging in criminal
behavior), and imitation or modeling (learning by observing others). Silver, supra note 141, at
691–92 (describing social learning theory in the context of violence); see also Ronald L. Akers,
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Professor Ronald Akers, interaction and association with others’
behavioral and normative patterns shapes “one’s own attitudes or
meanings that one attaches to given behavior.”147 Key factors in the
initiation and maintenance of criminal behavior are social support for that
behavior and antisocial cognitions, as well as antisocial personality
features such as anger, impulsivity, and recklessness.148 Other relevant
factors include substance abuse and indicators of social achievement,
such as educational and employment status.149 Social learning theory
posits that criminal behavior can be influenced by imitation and by
differential reinforcement, or, in other words, “the balance of anticipated
or actual rewards and punishments that follow or are consequences of
behavior.”150 Treatment “thus largely involves interventions that create
learning experiences for offenders in which antisocial cognitions and
behaviors are replaced with prosocial cognitions and behaviors,”
addressing the problems or deficits that contribute to criminal offending,
and increasing rewards and satisfaction for alternatives to criminal
behavior.151
1. Risk, Need, and Responsivity
Within this theoretical structure, the RNR model provides a blueprint
for effective correctional treatment. The treatment framework involves
three core principles: risk, need, and responsivity. The risk principle
holds that the intensity of treatment services should match the offender’s
risk level.152 Effectuating this principle requires designing and properly
using reliable and valid evidence-based risk assessment instruments and
then appropriately matching the level of service to an offender’s risk
level.153 On the latter point, offenders at the highest risk levels should
receive the most intensive services in order to yield the greatest
reductions in recidivism.154 Low-level offenders, on the other hand,
should receive minimal or no services.155 Indeed, some studies have
found that the intensive treatment of low-risk offenders can make them
Social Learning Theory, in EXPLAINING CRIMINALS AND CRIME: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 192, 192–210 (R. Paternoster & R. Bachman eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Akers, Social Learning Theory] (detailing elements of theory).
147. Akers, Social Learning Theory, supra note 146, at 195.
148. See Andrews & Bonta, supra note 31, at 44.
149. Id.
150. Akers, Social Learning Theory, supra note 146, at 195.
151. Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299, 341
(2013); accord BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 48.
152. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 176 tbl.9.1.
153. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 139, at 9.
154. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 190–91.
155. Id.
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more likely to recidivate, probably because of their association with
higher risk offenders and increased surveillance.156
The need principle dictates that, to reduce risk of recidivism, treatment
must focus on addressing an offender’s set of dynamic criminogenic
needs—those psycho-social-biological factors proven to influence and
maintain criminal behavior—as opposed to focusing on other needs that
are more distally related to offending.157 According to Andrews and
colleagues:
The most promising intermediate targets include
changing antisocial attitudes, feelings, and peer associations;
promoting familial affection in combination with enhanced
parental monitoring and supervision; promoting
identification with anticriminal role models; increasing selfcontrol and self-management skills; replacing the skills of
lying, stealing, and aggression with other, more prosocial
skills; reducing chemical dependencies; and generally
shifting the density of rewards and costs for criminal and
noncriminal activities in familial, academic, vocational, and
other behavioral settings.158
The responsivity principle, which consists of general and specific
components, focuses on effective service delivery. General responsivity
dictates that interventions should target the right variables and be capable
of addressing those variables.159 Consistent with the criminological
theory underlying RNR, general responsivity calls for the use of
cognitive-behavioral and cognitive-social learning strategies to influence
behavior.160 Appropriate strategies include modeling and skill
development, rehearsal, role playing, reinforcement, resource provision,
detailed verbal guidance and explanations, and “practicing new, low-risk
alternative behaviors repeatedly in a variety of high-risk situations until
one gets very good at it.”161 Applications of these practices involve the
utilization of certain core correctional skills, including effective use of
authority (a “firm but fair” approach), prosocial (anti-criminal) modeling

156. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 139, at 10 (collecting studies).
157. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 191–92; see supra notes 128–32 and
accompanying text (discussing the Central Eight criminogenic needs).
158. D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 375 (1990).
159. See Cullen, supra note 151, at 342–43.
160. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 180, 182.
161. Id. at 182.
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and positive reinforcement, problem-solving, brokerage of community
resources, and high quality relationships between staff and offenders.162
The principle of specific responsivity, on the other hand, holds that
service providers should tailor intervention strategies to match the setting
of service and an offender’s relevant characteristics.163 Of the core RNR
principles, specific responsivity is the least developed or understood.164
In 1995, Bonta stated that specific responsivity “focuses on personal
characteristics that regulate an individual’s ability and motivation to
learn.”165 To facilitate effective treatment, programs should build on an
individual’s strengths and reduce barriers to participation.166
Researchers differ in how they define and measure the variables
contained within the concept of specific responsivity.167 Responsivity
factors may be internal to the individual (that is, motivation, interpersonal
anxiety, depression, cognitive deficits, personality characteristics,
gender, age, or ethnicity) or external (that is, language barriers, lack of
stable housing, or therapist characteristics).168 Many responsivity factors
appear unrelated to recidivism but require amelioration before the
effective treatment of criminogenic needs can commence;169 other factors
may also function as risk factors and therefore require a more sustained
treatment approach.170 Because many responsivity factors must be
addressed before correctional treatment begins, addressing these factors
is often a short-term goal, while decreasing recidivism (through the

162. See Andrews et al., supra note 158, at 375–76; Dowden & Andrews, supra note 140, at
204.
163. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 180.
164. See Thomas H. Cohen & Jay Whetzel, The Neglected “R”—Responsivity and the
Federal Offender, 78 FED. PROB. 11, 12 (2014); Sarah McCormick et al., The Role of Mental
Health and Specific Responsivity in Juvenile Justice Rehabilitation, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55,
56 (2017).
165. James Bonta, The Responsivity Principle and Offender Rehabilitation, 7 F.
CORRECTIONS RES. 34, 35 (1995).
166. D.A. Andrews, The Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) Model of Correctional Assessment
and Treatment, in USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REDUCE VIOLENT OFFENDING 127, 139 (Joel A.
Dvoskin et al. eds., 2011).
167. See Tracey A. Vieira et al., Matching Court-Ordered Services with Treatment Needs:
Predicting Treatment Success with Young Offenders, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 385, 399 (2009);
see also Cohen & Whetzel, supra note 164, at 11 (describing various ways in which specific
responsivity may be conceived).
168. See Jan Looman et al., Responsivity Issues in the Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 6
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 330, 336–37 (2005) (discussing internal and external factors).
169. See Bonta, supra note 165, at 37 (noting that anxiety, depression, and some severe forms
of mental disorder are responsivity factors that are not significantly predictive of recidivism).
170. See id. (noting that antisocial personality or psychopathy is an example of a responsivity
factor that also functions as a risk factor).
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treatment of criminogenic needs) is the ultimate long-term goal.171
Appropriate responses to responsivity concerns include adapting the
delivery or composition of an intervention directed at criminogenic needs
and the “targeting of noncriminogenic needs for purposes of enhancing
motivation, the reduction of distracting factors, and for reasons having to
do with humanitarian and entitlement issues.”172 “Despite the intuitive
appeal of [the specific responsivity] principle,” little empirical research
has investigated its applicability to correctional rehabilitation.173
2. Mental Illness and Specific Responsivity
Social scientists have conceptualized mental health features, such as
anxiety and depression, as specific responsivity factors that may impede
the treatment of criminogenic needs.174 Mental illness is a destabilizer
that increases life’s demands, affects decision-making, and generates
stress.175 As Andrews and Bonta pithily explained, “[o]ne cannot
successfully deal with a substance addiction if the client is psychotic; one
cannot deal with employment problems if the person is suicidal.”176
Numerous meta-analyses establish that mental health factors (and the
treatment thereof) are largely unrelated to recidivism,177 but scholars have
hypothesized that an individual’s mental illness may need to be stabilized
so that she will be willing and able to participate in criminogenic-focused
interventions.178 However, little empirical research has questioned the
171. See Faye S. Taxman, Second Generation of RNR: The Importance of Systemic
Responsivity in Expanding Core Principles of Responsivity, 78 FED. PROB. 32, 33 (2014).
172. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 177.
173. Dowden & Andrews, supra note 139, at 453; see also BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note
128, at 176 tbl.9.1 (“The evidence in regard to specific responsivity is generally favorable but
very scattered, and it has yet to be subjected to a comprehensive meta-analysis.”); Cohen &
Whetzel, supra note 164, at 17 (“Responsivity is an important but under-investigated component
of the RNR framework. Indeed, beyond a few succinct descriptions of the principle itself, there is
minimal extant research.”).
174. See, e.g., BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 139, at 7; Bonta, supra note 165, at 36 tbl.1;
Taxman, supra note 171, at 33, 35. Importantly, the RNR model does not opine on the responsivity
effect of particular diagnostic categories of mental illnesses but rather speaks to “particular
features” of mental health and functioning. See McCormick et al., supra note 18, at 217–18; see,
e.g., BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 345 tbl.15.4 (including “[c]ognitive/[i]nterpersonal
[s]kill [l]evel,” “[i]nterpersonal [a]nxiety,” and “[a]ntisocial [p]ersonality [p]attern” factors, as
well as “[m]ental [d]isorder,” under the specific responsivity principle).
175. See Taxman, supra note 171, at 35–36 (discussing the importance of stabilizers and
destabilizers to specific responsivity).
176. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 192.
177. See supra Section I.C.
178. See, e.g., Bonta, supra note 165, at 36 (“Anxiety, depression and perhaps even some
severe forms of mental disorder are key responsivity factors. . . . [B]efore targeting criminogenic
needs such as antisocial attitudes, responsivity factors may need to be addressed to prepare the
offender to learn prosocial behaviour.”).

544

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

import of various aspects of mental health or mental health treatment for
effective correctional treatment.179 Because “responsivity variables have
received little empirical attention in the RNR literature . . . this
classification of mental health variables contributes little clarification as
to their role, either in terms of risk assessment or rehabilitative
programming.”180
Thus, it is currently unclear whether the treatment of mental health
features facilitates or enhances the treatment of criminogenic needs.181
One recent study, published by clinical psychologist Sarah McCormick
and colleagues in 2016, sought to address this question.182 The study
“investigated the relationships among mental health status, criminogenic
needs treatment, and recidivism” of 232 youths who were referred for
court-ordered assessments to inform sentencing.183 The researchers found
that the youths who received mental health treatment were more likely to
have their criminogenic needs addressed—and to have a greater
proportion of their criminogenic needs addressed—than those youths
whose mental health needs were not addressed.184 This finding suggested
that mental health may be best conceptualized as a specific responsivity
variable of “relevance to treatment engagement and success,” with
“influence . . . at the intermediate stage of completion of criminogenic
needs treatment.”185 Particularly noteworthy is that McCormick et al.’s
study did not support the hypothesis that mental health treatment
functioned as a responsivity factor (that is, as a moderator of the effect of
criminogenic needs treatment on recidivism).186 The study found that
“whether or not youths’ mental health needs were treated did not predict
recidivism, nor did it moderate the effect of treating criminogenic needs
on the outcome.”187 Specific responsivity is a topic of growing interest in
the behavioral health science community, so our understanding of this
important principle should evolve as research continues.188
179. See Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 920 (“We are aware of no empirical support for the
responsivity principle among persons with mental illness.”).
180. McCormick et al., supra note 18, at 218.
181. Id. at 220.
182. See McCormick et al., supra note 164, at 55.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 60, 63.
185. Id. at 63.
186. Id. at 61, 63 (“The alternative conceptualization of responsivity—that of mental health
treatment as a moderator of the success of intervention targeted to criminogenic needs—was not
supported; youth who had more of their criminogenic needs addressed through intervention were
less likely to reoffend regardless of mental health functioning.”).
187. Id. at 61.
188. See McCormick et al., supra note 18, at 218 (listing researchers examining issues
around RNR model implementation).
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B. Current Implementation of RNR Model
Even though “there is as yet no direct support for the applicability of
the three core RNR principles to treat this population,”189 a groundswell
is building to apply the RNR model to offenders with serious mental
illness. This chorus consists of federal agencies, policy advocates, and
social scientists and has resulted in the development of new risk
assessment
instruments
and
adapted
cognitive-behavioral
interventions.190 Few, if any, however, recognize that the normalization
theory and the RNR model may call for a radical shift in the relationship
of criminal justice to mental health. Indeed, the logic of this theory and
correctional model call into question the very existence of current,
popular criminal justice programs such as jail diversion programs, mental
health courts, specialized probation and parole, and specialized reentry
programs.
The federal government now endorses the RNR model for allocation
of services to individuals with mental illness in correctional institutions
or on parole or probation.191 In 2012, the Council of State Governments
Justice Center, in partnership with a number of federal agencies,192
published a white paper that introduced a framework coordinating the
activities of correctional and behavioral health service providers for this
population.193 The paper notes that “[r]ecent studies” undermine the
criminalization theory and “suggest[] that interventions to reduce
recidivism among people with mental illnesses in the criminal justice
system need to not only include traditional mental health treatment, but
also incorporate new multifaceted strategies.”194 The framework for
resource allocation includes three dimensions: criminogenic risk, need
189. Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 916. Skeem and colleagues warn that, before the
criminal justice and behavioral health systems prioritize correctional services to reduce recidivism
over psychiatric services to improve clinical outcomes,
[t]here must be explicit recognition that these services are being applied to a new
population with unique characteristics (mental illness combined with justice
system involvement), such that generalizability from the general offender
population is uncertain and must be tested. . . . Services may not be effective if
we shortcut studying how the unique features of this group affect the process and
outcome of treatment.
Id. at 917.
190. See infra notes 201–07 and accompanying text.
191. See OSHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 45.
192. These agencies include the Department of Justice’s National Institute of Corrections
and Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Department of Health and Human Service’s Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSA). See id. at iii.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 5.
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for mental health treatment, and need for substance abuse treatment.195 In
accordance with RNR principles, the framework dictates that institutions
and practitioners prioritize those offenders at higher risk of recidivism to
receive scarce correctional programming, services, and treatment
resources.196 Providers should only address offenders’ mental health
needs to the extent necessary to allow for the successful treatment of
criminogenic needs and to satisfy constitutional obligations.197
The federal government has promoted the operationalization of this
framework through funding and guidance. In 2013 and 2017, it issued
guidelines to assist mental health, correctional, and community
stakeholders in assessing criminological and clinical needs, planning
appropriate treatment in custody and upon reentry, identifying postrelease services, and coordinating with community-based providers to
avoid gaps in treatment.198 Since fiscal year 2011,199 the Bureau of Justice
Assistance has prioritized applications which include the “use of
criminogenic and violence risk assessments to identify and prioritize
treatment and case management services for individuals at risk for
committing future violence.”200 Federal agencies have also publicized
examples of state and local programs that assess criminogenic and
clinical needs, identify criminogenic needs as treatment targets, and favor
those offenders with the highest risk of recidivism for treatment.201
195. See id. at 32, 33 fig.5.
196. See id. at 24, 36.
197. See id. at 7, 24, 35–36. The white paper stresses that low-risk inmates with high clinical
needs should not be prioritized for the receipt of scarce mental health services, programming, or
other correctional resources such as monitoring and supervision on probation. See id. at 21. Such
inmates, if incarcerated, should have their needs addressed to the extent necessary to satisfy
correctional institutions’ duties to provide health care under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 7.
On probation or at reentry, “these low-risk/high-need individuals should be linked to effective
treatments for which they are eligible and that can be paid for by existing behavioral health
financing mechanisms, such as Medicaid and other local, state, and federal funding sources.” Id.
at 35.
198. See ALEX M. BLANDFORD & FRED OSHER, GUIDELINES FOR THE SUCCESSFUL
TRANSITION OF PEOPLE WITH BEHAVIORAL HEALTH DISORDERS FROM JAIL AND PRISON 5 (2013),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Guidelines-for-Successful-Transition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R47S-G6DF]; POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCS., GUIDELINES FOR SUCCESSFUL
TRANSITION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL OR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS FROM JAIL AND PRISON:
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 8–19 (2017), https://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA164998/SMA16-4998.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJZ7-XNNH].
199. See OSHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 47.
200. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0329, JUSTICE AND MENTAL HEALTH
COLLABORATION PROGRAM FY 2018 COMPETITIVE GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT 8 (2018),
https://www.bja.gov/funding/JMHCP18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WCV-DGLX].
201. See, e.g., id. at 1; see also POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 198, at 4–5; U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL PRISONS: INFORMATION ON INMATES WITH SERIOUS
MENTAL ILLNESS AND STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM 24, 29 (2018).
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In response to this call to action and the decades of science preceding
it, social scientists have begun to create or adapt evidence-based
assessment tools and interventions for use with offenders with mental
illness. Empirical studies support the use of general risk assessment
tools—including the leading correctional tool, the Levels of Service/Case
Management Inventory (LS/CMI)—to measure this group’s risk of
recidivism.202 On the treatment front, Robert Morgan and colleagues
created the Changing Lives and Changing Outcomes program, an
evidence-based intervention that addresses mental health and
criminogenic needs.203 When adapting general risk reduction
interventions, scholars have emphasized that modifications may be
necessary to address the treatment needs of offenders with serious mental
illness, accommodate their particular cognitive and emotional
impairments, and deliver the intervention in a community mental health
setting.204 To date, one popular structured cognitive-behavioral
intervention for criminogenic risk factors—the “Reasoning and
Rehabilitation” (R&R) program—has been modified to accommodate the
learning abilities of offenders with mental illness.205 Several controlled
studies have shown that this modified version can improve coping skills
and reduce antisocial attitudes, violent thoughts, disruptive behavior, and
substance abuse among forensic patients.206 Other programs—including
Thinking for a Change, Options, Moral Reconation Therapy, and
Interactive Journaling—have also been applied to offenders with mental
illness.207 In addition, structural mental health interventions that
“emphasize clinical features associated with criminality, such as
frustration intolerance, social skills deficits, and misperceptions of the

202. See Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 917–18.
203. Robert D. Morgan et al., Treating Justice Involved Persons with Mental Illness:
Preliminary Evaluation of a Comprehensive Treatment Program, 41 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 902,
904 (2014). While a preliminary evaluation showed reductions in psychological symptoms and
criminal thinking, the program’s effect on recidivism is unknown. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra
note 128, at 330.
204. See Morgan et al., supra note 136, at 334–36; Merrill Rotter & W. Amory Carr,
Targeting Criminal Recidivism in Mentally Ill Offenders: Structured Clinical Approaches, 47
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 723, 724–25 (2011); Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 120–21; Amy
Blank Wilson et al., Translating Interventions that Target Criminogenic Risk Factors for use in
Community Based Mental Health Settings, 53 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 893, 894 (2017).
205. See Skeem et al., supra note 100.
206. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 328–29; Skeem et al., supra note 100
(collecting studies).
207. See MERRILL ROTTER & W. AMORY CARR, REDUCING CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM FOR
JUSTICE-INVOLVED PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: RISK/NEEDS/RESPONSIVITY AND COGNITIVEBEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS 2–3 (2013), http://forensiccounselor.org/images/file/ReduceCrim
RecidMIRiskNeedsResponCogBehavInter.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCV5-G65B].
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environment” have been modified for justice-involved individuals.208
These efforts are nascent, however, and it appears that very little
treatment currently offered to offenders with mental illness coheres with
the RNR model.209
Social scientists also argue that “first generation” specialized justice
programs—such as jail diversion programs, mental health courts,
specialized probation and parole, and reentry programs—should adapt to
reflect RNR principles.210 Currently, these programs reflect the
criminalization notions that mental illness drives criminal behavior, and
mental health treatment will reduce reoffending.211 Although working at
different points in the justice process,212 they are unified in their approach
of using the justice system to leverage engagement with community
mental health treatment.213 Consistent with the RNR framework, social
scientists and policy advocates contend that these specialized programs
should be modified to address criminogenic needs and to allocate
resources by risk level. For example, researchers have urged mental
health courts to increase attention to participants’ criminogenic needs.214
208. See id. at 3 (discussing the use of Dialectical Behavioral Therapy and Schema Focused
Therapy).
209. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 321 (“Clinical interventions with the MDO
[mentally disordered offender] usually involve treating psychological complaints or the behaviors
that are disruptive to the functioning of the institution.”); Marshall T. Bewley & Robert D.
Morgan, A National Survey of Mental Health Services Available to Offenders with Mental Illness:
Who Is Doing What?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 351, 360 (2011) (finding, in a survey of 230 mental
health service providers in 165 state correctional facilities, that only 15.7% reported incorporating
each of the three RNR principles into their work with offenders with mental illness).
210. See Epperson et al., supra note 3, at 427 (defining “first generation” interventions as
those that (a) “are united by a common philosophy and theme: criminal justice involvement of
people with SMI [serious mental illness] is reduced primarily by providing mental health
treatment to these individuals” and (b) have as a “principal objective . . . to create or strengthen
linkages to effective mental health services”); Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 112 (identifying the
“most common types of contemporary programs for offenders with mental illness” as falling into
four categories: “jail diversion programs, problem-solving courts, specialty probation or parole
caseloads, and jail transition or prison re-entry programs”).
211. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 328–31; Epperson et al., supra note 3, at
434 (“While anecdotal examples of such programs [incorporating a broader perspective beyond
mental illness in identifying targets for intervention] do exist, the preponderance of first
generation models do not systematically target the range of risk factors discussed in our person–
place framework.”); Skeem et al., supra note 38.
212. See Mark R. Munetz & Patricia A. Griffin, Use of the Sequential Intercept Model as an
Approach to Decriminalization of People with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS.
544, 544–45 (2006).
213. See Peterson et al., supra note 95, at 1218.
214. See, e.g., Natalie Bonfine et al., Exploring the Relationship Between Criminogenic Risk
Assessment and Mental Health Court Program Completion, 45 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 9, 15
(2016); Mary Ann Campbell et al., Multidimensional Evaluation of a Mental Health Court:
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Several scholars have also suggested limiting these courts to high-risk
individuals at high clinical need,215 or, alternatively, accepting all
individuals with high clinical needs but adopting multiple supervision
tracks to address different levels of criminogenic risk.216 In addition,
researchers have urged specialized mental health probation officers to
focus more on criminogenic needs in client meetings.217 Others have
urged consideration of RNR principles in reentry218 and jail diversion
programs.219 However, recent commentary on the state of correctional
programs reflects that these programs largely remain focused on
clinical—not criminogenic—needs.220
Although calls for reform are increasingly common, few individuals
have questioned the existence of these “first generation” programs
altogether.221 Scholars’ allegiance to these programs and their continued
focus on mental health treatment may be explained by their confidence in
the status of mental illness as a major responsivity factor.222 Despite the
Adherence to the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 489, 490 (2015); Fisler,
supra note 143.
215. See Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 122 (advancing a model that would reserve intensive
supervision and psychiatric treatment for those with the greatest criminogenic risk and clinical
need and merely provide “good enough” supervision and community treatment for low-risk, lowneed individuals).
216. See Bonfine et al., supra note 214, at 14 (suggesting this approach).
217. See Jennifer Eno Louden et al., Supervision Practices in Specialty Mental Health
Probation: What Happens in Officer-Probationer Meetings?, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 109, 116–
18 (2012).
218. See Cheryl Lero Jonson & Francis T. Cullen, Prisoner Reentry Programs, 44 CRIME &
JUST. 517, 553–57 (2015).
219. See Virginia Barber-Rioja et al., Diversion Evaluations: A Specialized Forensic
Examination, 35 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 418, 421, 423 (2017) (calling for diversion evaluations to
include assessment and consideration of both clinical and criminogenic needs).
220. See Debra A. Pinals, Jail Diversion, Specialty Court, and Reentry Services:
Partnerships between Behavioral Health and Justice Systems, in PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE OF
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 237, 239 (Richard Rosner & Charles Scott eds., 3d ed. 2017) (reviewing
the evolution of jail diversion and reentry programs and stating that, while RNR “is an
increasingly emphasized sorting approach to help determine who can benefit most from particular
diversion strategies,” “[t]raditional clinical services have not embraced or incorporated these
[RNR] concepts yet”); see also Epperson et al., supra note 3, at 427 (pointing out the emphasis
certain interventions place on clinical and mental health services).
221. See, e.g., Epperson et al., supra note 3, at 436 (observing that “[w]hile some existing
first generation interventions may be amenable to adaptation, the need for second-generation
philosophical and practical approaches will also likely require entirely new and innovative
intervention models,” and suggesting a module-based approach).
222. See, e.g., MARGARET SEVERSON & JASON MATEJKOWSKI, REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
ON JAIL DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
MENTAL HEALTH COURT AND CRISIS CENTER WITHIN DOUGLAS COUNTY, KANSAS 7 (2014) (noting,
in a literature review of mental health diversion programs, that “the presence of a mental illness
is a personal characteristic to which programs targeting criminogenic needs must be responsive”
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lack of empirical support for the responsivity principle,223 scholars and
advocates appear to view mental health’s status as a responsivity factor
as “largely settled.”224 This uncritical stance could lead to the unjustified
and inefficient continuation of programs that yield sub-maximal
recidivism reductions and, in segregating individuals with mental illness
and treating them specially, reinforce stigma and harmful stereotypes.
Andrews has warned:
Sometimes, . . . specific responsivity concerns are
misused as a way to keep doing what has always been done.
For example, a focus on relieving mental illness . . . may be
treated as even more important than adherence with the core
RNR principles. Noncriminogenic needs that clinicians
enjoy addressing may be declared mistakenly to be specific
responsivity factors that demand special attention.225
Furthermore, Andrews has observed that “once the targeting of
noncriminogenic needs becomes dominant, . . . programs are virtually
never adherent to other RNR principles.”226 These service providers also
tend to prioritize low-risk individuals and often fail to offer the most
effective interventions.227 Hence, dogmatic adherence to the notion that
mental illness is a major responsivity factor “constitutes crime prevention
programming that is decidedly less than ‘smart.’”228

and concluding that “[t]here is nothing fundamentally at odds with providing needed mental health
services while adopting an RNR approach with those clients who are engaging in criminal
behaviors”); Fisler, supra note 143 (“Mental illness still plays a role in the RNR framework, but
as a responsivity factor that affects a person’s ability to participate in and learn from interventions
designed to address criminogenic needs. . . . In this context, treatment for mental illness remains
crucial for mental health court participants, not because improvements in symptoms or
functioning will have a direct impact on criminal behavior but because treatment will improve
their ability to respond to interventions to change criminal behavior.”).
223. See supra notes 163–73 and accompanying text (citing to literature exploring the
principles of specific responsivity); supra Subsection III.A.2 (identifying mental illness as a
specific responsivity factor).
224. McCormick et al., supra note 18, at 218; see also Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 920
(“We are aware of no empirical support for the responsivity principle among persons with mental
illness. Nevertheless, in contemporary discourse about applying the RNR model to this group,
mental illness is often asserted to be a (specific) responsivity issue.” (endnote omitted)).
225. Andrews, supra note 166.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citation omitted).

2019]

RECONCEPTUALIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM

551

IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR OFFENDERS
WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS
The sizeable body of evidence supporting the normalization
hypothesis undercuts the basis of “first generation” programs for
offenders with mental illness and calls into question their utility.229
Taking the normalization realization seriously means starting from the
premise that offenders with mental illness are more similar to than
different from offenders without mental illness. The RNR framework
leads to the necessary inquiry of whether specialized justice programs for
this population are even warranted. A correctional system in accord with
RNR principles would prioritize treating the criminogenic needs of those
offenders who are at the highest risk of reoffending, regardless of their
noncriminogenic needs. Social scientists and criminal justice institutions
should consider the extent to which individuals with serious mental
illness fall within this priority group and—consistent with the legal norm
of accommodating individuals with mental illness within the least
restrictive environment230—weigh whether they can be treated in
integrated settings such that they are rendered amenable to correctional
intervention. This inquiry is made even more urgent by the scarcity of
correctional and behavioral health resources.231
The criminalization myth and the pernicious stereotype of mental
illness as dominant and violence-inducing contribute to the unblinking
assumption that specialized criminal justice programs that emphasize
mental health treatment make sense. Also, conceptualizing mental illness
as a major driver of crime helps to rationalize the consolidation of mental
health treatment in the criminal justice realm. If most seriously ill
individuals will encounter the justice system as their health
deteriorates,232 providing mental health treatment in that space may be an
efficient means of providing treatment to those most in need.
Understanding the actual, largely indirect relationship between mental
illness and crime, however, counsels providing mental health treatment
229. See Epperson et al., supra note 3, at 427 (defining “first generation” programs).
230. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012); 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(d) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2) (2018).
231. See OSHER ET AL., supra note 2, at vii, 10.
232. See William H. Fisher et al., Patterns and Prevalence of Arrest in a Statewide Cohort
of Mental Health Care Consumers, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1623, 1625 (2006) (finding, in study
of a statewide cohort of individuals who received public mental health services in a given year
(n=13,816), that 27.9% were arrested at least once over the roughly ten-year follow-up period);
id. at 1626 (noting that the population studied “consisted of individuals whose psychiatric
illnesses were sufficiently serious and disabling that they had been deemed eligible for services
under the relatively stringent eligibility criteria typical of state mental health agencies in the early
1990s”).
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earlier and more broadly. Privileging those who commit criminal offenses
with scarce mental health resources simply as a response to misbehavior
and subsequent state control is perverse. Instead, these resources should
be delivered via systematic efforts to achieve public safety benefits.
Moreover, in the absence of a compelling public safety rationale,233 it is
discriminatory to use the criminal justice system to coerce medical
treatment for a discrete class of individuals—those with serious mental
illness—without a finding of incompetency to make treatment
decisions.234 This state action overrides the fundamental liberty right of
individuals to choose (or decline) medical treatment.235
This observation should not detract attention from the urgent need to
address existing, insufferable deficiencies in correctional mental health
care. Correctional institutions have a constitutional duty to provide
reasonably adequate mental health care to inmates.236 Despite this
obligation, nationwide studies consistently reveal that 30% to 60% of
inmates with serious mental health needs receive no form of mental
233. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (“We hold that, given the
requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison
inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”).
234. See Jennifer Eno Louden & Jennifer L. Skeem, How Do Probation Officers Assess and
Manage Recidivism and Violence Risk for Probationers with Mental Disorder? An Experimental
Investigation, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 22, 32 (2013) (“Requiring individuals who are involved
in the criminal justice system through no direct cause of their mental disorder to accept mental
health treatment is a form of structural stigma.”).
235. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (“The logical
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not
to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)
(“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. . . .”).
236. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (establishing “the government’s
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration” and
concluding “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” is prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 200 (1989) (“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause.”). Circuit courts of appeals have extended this principle to psychiatric and
psychological care. See, e.g., Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that
an inmate is “entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care
provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable
medical certainty (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that
such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for
harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial”).
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health treatment while incarcerated.237 Jails, in particular, do a poor job
of providing necessary medication and therapy.238 For instance, a 2017
study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that, among inmates who
had previously been told they had a mental disorder, 37% of prisoners
and 56% of jail inmates reported not having received any form of mental
health treatment since admission.239 Perhaps even more alarming, 64% of
prisoners and 70% of jail inmates who met the threshold for serious
psychological distress said they were not currently receiving mental
health treatment.240 This failure to provide needed health care causes
unconscionable suffering to persons with serious mental illness.241
Failing to respond to acute and chronic mental health needs predictably
leads to mental deterioration, psychotic break, victimization by staff and
inmates, inability to comply with institutional rules, and housing in
isolation, all of which compound suffering.242
Considering the important (and currently neglected) duty to provide
adequate mental health care to inmates, the normalization realization
should call into question the allocation of resources for specialized justice
programs—such as mental health courts, jail diversion programs,
specialized probation and parole, and reentry programs—that provide
mental health services to select individuals under the guise of reducing
recidivism. These programs—which currently effect minimal recidivism
237. See PAULA M. DITTON, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND
PROBATIONERS 9 (1999), http://bjs.gov./content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3E5-JV86]
(finding, in nationwide surveys and interviews of inmates, that—of those identified as having a
mental health condition—59% of jail inmates, 39% of state prisoners, and 40% of federal
prisoners reported having not received any form of mental health services since admission);
Jennifer M. Reingle Gonzalez & Nadine M. Connell, Mental Health of Prisoners: Identifying
Barriers to Mental Health Treatment and Medication Continuity, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 2328,
2330–32 (2014) (finding, in a study of interview data from 18,185 prisoners, that 48% of inmates
in federal prison—and 58% of inmates in state prisons—who were medicated for mental health
conditions at admission did not receive medication during their prison sentence); Andrew P.
Wilper et al., The Health and Health Care of US Prisoners: Results of a Nationwide Survey, 99
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 666, 668–70 (2009) (finding, in interviews of 25,167 inmates, that—among
inmates with a mental condition ever treated with psychiatric medication—31% of federal, 31%
of state, and 54% of local jail inmates were not receiving psychiatric medication after admission).
Mental health treatment in correctional settings is often limited to psychiatric medications due to
fiscal, space, and temporal constraints. Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 3, at 922; see JENNIFER
BRONSON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY
PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–12, at 8–9 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
imhprpji1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/22RD-EQ2S].
238. See, e.g., HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 16 (“By all accounts, jails across the
country are even less able to care for mentally ill prisoners than prisons.”).
239. See BRONSON & BERZOFSKY, supra note 237, at 8.
240. See id.
241. See HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 53–69.
242. See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 10.
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reductions and may be highly resource-intensive243—should be
eliminated and the resources used elsewhere unless new, supportable
justifications can be established. At least four possible justifications exist
and are outlined below.
A. Possible Justifications for Specialized Programs
1. Mental Illness as a Barrier
The first possible justification for the existence of specialized justice
programs is often posited as established:244 Serious mental illness is a
significant responsivity obstacle that requires redress before the effective
treatment of criminogenic needs is possible.245 The “barrier”
conceptualization implies that treatment may be provided sequentially
(that is, treatment to stabilize the mental illness, then treatment of a
criminogenic need).246 This theory has considerable intuitive power. For
example, the treatment for antisocial attitudes involves learning, but
before an individual with schizophrenia can learn new ways of reacting
to problematic situations, her psychosis must be effectively treated.247
Hence, stabilizing mental illness might be necessary to effectively treat
some key criminogenic needs—such as antisocial attitudes248—or some
combination of dynamic needs.249 This model, where mental illness
serves as a barrier that must be overcome prior to treatment, may be
particularly suitable for certain mental disorders such as major

243. See Skeem et al., supra note 1, at 114 (“[T]here is, at best, mixed evidence that these
programs as a whole reduce recidivism.”).
244. See, e.g., Cohen & Whetzel, supra note 164, at 11 (“Even more broadly, . . . responsivity
factors are conceived by various community corrections scholars as barriers to offenders’
successful supervision and reintegration. A responsivity factor may preclude an offender from
participating in an intervention (e.g., CBT group), thus leaving the underlying risk factors
unaddressed. This requires officers to first mitigate responsivity factors so that the work of risk
reduction can begin.” (citation omitted)).
245. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
246. See Epperson et al., supra note 3, at 434 (“For example, intervening to change antisocial
cognitions would not make sense if the justice-involved person is actively psychotic, experiencing
a seizure, or intoxicated, even though criminal thinking is a stronger predictor of criminal behavior
than mental illness, physical illness, or addiction.”).
247. See id.
248. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
249. See Faye S. Taxman et al., Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR): Leading Towards Another
Generation of the Model, in SIMULATION STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM 285, 287 (Faye S.
Taxman & April Pattavina eds., 2013) (“The consideration of a spectrum of dynamic needs alters
the emphasis of the model and allows the RNR model to be more directly tied to responsivity
(appropriate correctional programming).”).
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depression, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorders, and bipolar
disorder.250
According to this model, as Sarah McCormick and colleagues have
observed, mental illness functions as a moderator of intervention
effectiveness, such that successfully addressing the mental illness
increases the effectiveness of interventions targeting criminogenic
needs.251 However, as previously discussed,252 it is currently unclear
how—and whether—mental illness may function in this way, either by
allowing for the identification and treatment of more criminogenic needs
or by increasing that treatment’s effectiveness at reducing recidivism.253
As of yet, there is no evidence to support the latter hypothesis, and only
nascent evidence to support the former.
2. Mental Illness as a Reinforcing Factor
A second possible justification for specialized programs is that mental
illness and criminogenic needs may be reinforcing or even synergistic,
such that they must be simultaneously addressed in order to reduce
recidivism. This theory also has yet to be established by rigorous testing.
Certain mental illnesses may reinforce or coexist with aspects of
antisocial personality that function as criminogenic risk factors.254
Research indicates that antisocial attitudes may be a top risk factor for
recidivism255 and that offenders with mental illness may be particularly
likely to have high levels of criminogenic cognitions.256 For example, in
a 2011 study, Dr. Jon Mandracchia and Professor Robert Morgan found
that the presence of a psychological disorder was associated with more
250. See supra Subsection III.A.2; supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
251. McCormick et al., supra note 164.
252. See supra notes 182–87 and accompanying text (discussing findings in McCormick et
al., supra note 164).
253. McCormick et al., supra note 164, at 63.
254. See Bonta, supra note 165, at 36–37 (“A diagnosis of antisocial personality or
psychopathy are examples of the ways risk, criminogenic needs and responsivity may operate
together. Not only are such individuals more likely to recidivate (risk), but therapists may attempt
to target aspects of the antisocial personality, such as impulsivity (criminogenic need).”).
255. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 65–66; Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical
Status of Social Learning Theory: A Meta-Analysis, 27 JUST. Q. 765, 788–90 (2010).
256. See Jon T. Mandracchia & Robert D. Morgan, The Relationship Between Status
Variables and Criminal Thinking in an Offender Population, 7 PSYCHOL. SERVS. 27, 32 (2010)
(finding that, among general-population inmates, those who reported not currently receiving
mental health services endorsed higher levels of criminogenic cognitions than inmates who
reported receiving mental health services). In the risk literature, criminogenic or antisocial
cognitions refer to the “attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts that support crime.” Glenn D. Walters &
Matt DeLisi, Antisocial Cognition and Crime Continuity: Cognitive Mediation of the Past CrimeFuture Crime Relationship, 41 J. CRIM. JUST. 135, 135 (2013) (citing Andrews et al., supra note
116).
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criminogenic thinking, “whereas reception of mental health services was
associated with lower levels of criminal attitudes.”257 They suggested this
association was because “many psychological problems [including
depression and anxiety] consist of immature thinking patterns marked by
impulsivity, overgeneralizations, extreme judging, and self-pity.”258
Antisocial personality traits are inherent in the definitions of some mental
disorders—such as antisocial personality disorder, conduct disorder, and
attention deficit disorder—which indicates conceptual overlap whereby
antisocial cognitions or behaviors could be identified as a symptom of
mental illness or as a criminological factor.259 However, antisocial
personality traits may tend to associate with, but not be eclipsed by, other
disorders.260
In addition, Skeem and colleagues have noted the possibility that
mental disorders and criminogenic risk factors may act synergistically to
intensify overall risk of reoffending.261 Citing the research of Professor
Arthur Lurigio and associates,262 Skeem and colleagues observe that
individuals with mental disorders are much more likely to abuse
substances—one of the Central Eight general risk factors for crime—than
those without a mental disorder.263 In addition, studies demonstrate that
individuals with both a psychiatric and substance abuse disorder are much
more likely to commit a crime—and to be violent—than those with a
257. Jon T. Mandracchia & Robert D. Morgan, Predicting Offenders’ Criminogenic
Cognitions with Status Variables, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 5, 19 (2012). The study, which
involved 595 adult male incarcerated offenders, did not include data on particular diagnoses. See
id. at 8 (describing the methodology).
258. Id. at 20.
259. Skeem and colleagues have noted that “some ‘normative’ risk factors for crime (for
example, externalizing features such as anger and impulsivity) are also defined as symptoms of
some mental disorders.” Skeem et al., supra note 100.
260. See McCormick et al., supra note 164, at 62 (“[S]everal features assessed by the
personality/behavior domain may also be features of clinical diagnoses such as ADHD (e.g., poor
frustration tolerance, impulsivity) . . . [and] are frequently comorbid with mental health problems
such as anxiety and depression . . . .”).
261. Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 920; see also Ainslie M. McDougall, Understanding
Factors that Impact Responsivity Within Case Management Plans of Community-Based
Offenders with and Without Mental Health Needs 37–38 (June 2014) (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, University of New Brunswick), https://unbscholar.lib.unb.ca/islandora/object/
unbscholar%3A6504/datastream/PDF/view [https://perma.cc/3EWF-DUVY] (“[M]ental illness
may be best conceptualized as a potential destabilizing factor that can elevate the influence of
other criminal risk factors and reduce that of protective factors.”).
262. See Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Standardized Assessment of Substance-Related, Other
Psychiatric, and Comorbid Disorders Among Probationers, 47 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY &
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 630, 644 (2003) (finding, in a random sample of 627 adult probationers in
Illinois, that “55% of probationers with one or more current psychiatric disorders were dependent
on one or more substances, compared with 37% of those without any psychiatric disorders”).
263. Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 920.
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psychiatric diagnosis alone.264 These findings, observe Skeem and
colleagues, suggest that the noncriminogenic risk factor of mental illness
may both attract and exaggerate the effect of the criminogenic risk factor
of substance abuse.265 These researchers also suggest that “mental illness
can become ‘criminogenic’ when paired with other risk factors,” such as
a history of violence.266 Illustrating this possibility, Glenn Water and
Gregory Crawford found in a 2014 study that “[major mental illness] or
[violence history] in isolation were of questionable utility in predicting
aggressive and nonaggressive institutional infractions[,] but . . . when
combined, [major mental illness] and [violence history] demonstrated an
ability to predict future disciplinary problems.”267 In light of this research,
Skeem and colleagues observe:
[One] reason to avoid focusing services too exclusively on
general risk factors is that these variables may sometimes
interact with mental illness to exponentially increase risk.
When clinical factors potentiate general risk factors, they
become part of the criminogenic story that should be
assessed and targeted with services that are “wise” to their
interaction.268
Perhaps, then, the continued treatment of certain mental illnesses is
necessary to allow for the effective or efficient amelioration of certain
criminogenic needs.269 So long as that mental health treatment is best
provided in a specialized environment, “first-generation” programs that
address both the mental health and criminogenic needs of high-risk
individuals could be appropriate.
3. Alteration of Intervention
A third possible justification for specialized programs could be that
offenders with and without serious mental illness require different
interventions to effectively and efficiently treat their criminogenic needs,

264. See id. at 920–21 (first citing Junginger et al., supra note 35, at 879–82; then citing
Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient
Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 393–
401 (1998)).
265. Id. at 920.
266. Id.
267. Glenn D. Walters & Gregory Crawford, Major Mental Illness and Violence History as
Predictors of Institutional Misconduct and Recidivism: Main and Interaction Effects, 38 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 238, 243–44 (2014) (involving a sample of 2,627 male prison inmates).
268. Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 920.
269. See McCormick et al., supra note 164, at 62.
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and these interventions are best delivered in segregated environments.270
As mentioned previously, social scientists have posited that
modifications to general correctional interventions may be necessary to
address the particular treatment needs, cognitive and emotional
impairments, and delivery requirements of offenders with serious mental
illness.271 Researchers have begun to create and adapt evidence-based,
cognitive-behavioral interventions for use with this population,272 but the
effects of these specialized interventions on recidivism are unclear.273 As
Professor Faye Taxman and colleagues note, the RNR emphasis on
tailoring programming to offender profiles “is still being explored in
studies of correctional programming and offender outcomes.”274
4. Mental Illness as a Causal Factor
A fourth possibility is that these specialized justice programs are
necessary to deliver mental health treatment to the subgroup of offenders
“who are influenced primarily by mental health needs—and on whom
RNR-identified criminogenic needs have little influence.”275 As
previously discussed, studies suggest that symptoms directly precede
violence and other criminal behavior in a small subset of offenses.276
However, because research indicates that symptom-based crimes do not
cluster by person, it appears impossible to identify a reliable, symptomdriven subgroup.277 According to Skeem and colleagues, this research
suggests that, as a policy matter, “symptoms should be routinely treated
among justice-involved people with mental illness, with the
understanding that this may prevent a small but important minority of
(unpredictable) symptom-preceded crimes.”278 However, it is unclear
how “important”—or likely to be violent or particularly impactful—this
subset of crimes committed by offenders with serious mental illness is
and whether their relative import justifies this investment of resources.

270. See Bonta, supra note 165, at 37; Kirk Heilbrun et al., Risk-Reducing Interventions for
Justice-Involved Individuals: A Critical Review, in 2 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 271,
274 (Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller eds., 2016).
271. See Morgan et al., supra note 203.
272. See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text.
273. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 330.
274. See Taxman et al., supra note 249, at 288.
275. See Heilbrun et al., supra note 270.
276. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
278. Skeem et al., supra note 100.
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***
Serious mental illness is not a single conglomerate with a uniform set
of features.279 Indeed, no single mental illness has stable or uniform
aspects. Therefore, different mental illnesses may fall within the ambit of
different justifications and may satisfy multiple justifications
simultaneously or across time. To justify a specialized criminal justice
program, it may be unnecessary to scientifically verify a particular
justification for a particular diagnosis or set of individuals. Indeed,
establishing the scientific validity of some of these justifications—
particularly those involving mental illness as a responsivity factor—in
isolation would be very difficult given pragmatic data availability and
clinical control feasibility.280 This is especially the case considering that
serious mental illness and criminogenic risk factors, if they are related,
may interact as part of an emergent system that does not lend itself to
reductive efforts to test individual variables independently.281 Given the
likely limits of testing, behavioral health science researchers should
continue along the path charted by McCormick and colleagues, who, in
2017, began to investigate the extent to which mental illness and its
treatment may function as a moderator of intervention effectiveness.282
In the meantime, criminal justice programs should treat individuals
with serious mental illness with “next generation” programs that
prioritize criminogenic needs.283 These programs should be implemented
in a way that allows researchers to validly test whether these programs
can achieve recidivism outcomes that are at least as great as those yielded
by first generation programs among similar mentally disordered offender
populations. If so, this evidence would seem to demonstrate that the
279. See OSHER ET AL., supra note 2 (defining “serious mental illness”).
280. I appreciate this insight offered by my research assistant, John Hood.
281. See supra Subsection IV.A.2.
282. McCormick et al., supra note 164; see supra notes 182–87 and accompanying text.
283. See Epperson et al., supra note 3, at 428–29 (casting a vision for the next generation of
behavioral health and criminal justice interventions that would attend to the “empirically informed
individual and environmental factors that directly and indirectly contribute to criminal justice
involvement for individuals with SMI” as well as the “unique stressors attributable to their mental
illness,” which should improve their ability to reduce recidivism and psychiatric relapse); Skeem
et al., supra note 1, at 121; Wolff, supra note 27, at 74 (arguing that court systems could “adopt
rehabilitation harm reduction in the application of the law” and defining “rehabilitation harm” as
“the social and individual welfare interest loss associated with not identifying criminogenic risks
and needs, and harm is reduced by providing appropriate supervision, rehabilitation, and treatment
in response to these risks and needs”); cf. WILLIAM R. KELLY ET AL., FROM RETRIBUTION TO
PUBLIC SAFETY: DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 127 (2017) (“We
propose a diversion process on a scale unimagined in U.S. history . . . that has as the primary goal
the reduction of recidivism by means of a balance between risk management/supervision, on the
one hand, and evidence-based clinical intervention and rehabilitation, on the other.”).
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specialized environments of (currently composed) first-generation
programs that prioritize mental health are not the best way to address this
population. Thus, given the limited empirical support for the
criminalization justification of first generation programs and their
inherently discriminatory nature,284 these programs should be defunded
in favor of next generation programs that principally address
criminogenic risk factors.
B. Larger Foundational Questions
The determination of whether offenders with serious mental illness
warrant specialized programs should not turn solely on whether evidence
establishes some link between the treatment of mental illness and
criminogenic needs or recidivism. In addition to those crucial questions,
other questions that pertain to the overall allocation of resources in, and
purposes of, the criminal justice system must be answered.
1. Necessary Empirical Information
Specialized justice programs for offenders with serious mental illness
should exist only to the extent that their public safety benefits exceed
those that could be realized through a different allocation of resources.285
Many considerations are relevant in this equation. Understanding what
percentage of high-risk offenders have a serious mental illness would
provide useful context for determining the extent to which this population
should be a focus of special intervention.286 A more directly pertinent
question is the percentage of that group that can be serviced by a
particular specialized program. For instance, mental health courts, given
their intensive nature, can only ever serve a small fraction of offenders
with serious mental illness.287 Finally, it is crucial to understand the
effectiveness of these programs—ideally, when focused on treating the
criminogenic needs of higher risk individuals—at reducing recidivism
and the likelihood they can be administered faithfully such that expected
gains can be realized.288
284. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
285. But see infra Subsection IV.B.2 (questioning whether criminal justice resources should
be allocated to achieve goals other than public safety).
286. See infra notes 304–08, 320 and accompanying text.
287. See Alene Kennedy-Hendricks et al., Improving Access to Care and Reducing
Involvement in the Criminal Justice System for People with Mental Illness, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1076,
1080 (2016).
288. See supra note 242 and accompanying text; see also Jodi L. Viljeon et al., Do Risk
Assessment Tools Help Manage and Reduce Risk of Violence and Reoffending? A Systematic
Review, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181, 181 (2018) (concluding, from a systematic review of 73
published and unpublished studies, that “despite some promising findings, professionals do not
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To develop a complete picture of the possible benefit these specialized
programs may yield, it is necessary to understand the cost these offenders
pose to the justice system in these programs’ absence. In addition to
information on the recidivism rate of higher risk offenders with serious
mental illness,289 it would be useful to understand any likelihood of their
committing particularly violent or impactful crimes.290 Policymakers, in
addressing these concerns, must also consider expenses related to the
management of these offenders, including the costs to house, treat,
transport, supervise, deal with disciplinary infractions, and protect them
from victimization or self-harm.291
To understand whether resources allocated to special programs could
be better spent, it is necessary to gather information pertaining to higher
risk offenders without serious mental illness. In particular, it is important
to ascertain the percentage of the high- and moderate-risk general
population that has unmet criminogenic and responsivity needs beyond
mental illness, as well as the frequency, and ideally the potency, of each
need.292 The cost and effectiveness of treating each of these needs (as well
as common sets of criminogenic needs) is also significant. Another key
issue is the malleability of each criminogenic and responsivity variable,
and how much of an impediment each responsivity factor is (compared
to mental health features) to the effective treatment of criminogenic
needs.293 These questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
Researchers have developed an RNR Simulation Tool to assist justice
agencies in better allocating resources “to reduce recidivism through
responsivity to the primary treatment needs of their offender
populations.”294 The tool utilizes a reconceptualized RNR model that
consistently adhere to tools or apply them to guide their risk management efforts; [and,] following
the use of a tool, match to the risk principle is moderate and match to the needs principle is limited,
as many needs remained unaddressed”).
289. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
290. Cf. supra notes 110–22 and accompanying text (discussing meta-analyses showing that
clinical variables are, at most, weak predictors of risk).
291. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. It is difficult to determine these costs at the
systemic level. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 201, at 17–21 (finding that
the Bureau of Prisons does not track the cost of inmates with serious mental illness and selected
states track only a subset of these costs).
292. See Taxman et al., supra note 249, at 295–96 (estimating that only 10% of offenders
currently have access to treatment services).
293. See Cohen & Whetzel, supra note 164, at 17 (“When and how to provide assistance in
overcoming responsivity factors will depend on the offender’s overall risk level and the
malleability of the responsivity factor being targeted. . . . [M]ental health[] may change only very
slowly.”).
294. Taxman et al., supra note 249, at 298; see Erin L. Crites & Faye S. Taxman, The
Responsivity Principle: Determining the Appropriate Program and Dosage to Match Risk and
Needs, in SIMULATION STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM, supra note 249, at 143, 143–63

562

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

reflects the demonstrated relationship of individual needs to recidivism
and an expanded list of psychosocial and lifestyle factors that affect an
individual’s stability and amenability to services and control. 295 The
researchers created a synthetic, nationally representative data set with key
variables of risk, needs, demographic characteristics, and recidivism from
publicly available data sets of various offender populations.296 The model
creates “a taxonomy of correctional programming” that reflects the range
of services typically needed in a correctional setting, based on targets of
intervention and the features of programs likely to affect recidivism.297 A
jurisdiction’s actual programming distribution will reflect its actual
offender population and trove of available resources.298
The model also recommends distributions of programming that are
informed by the prevalence of criminogenic needs within the national
offender population.299 It suggests allocating the greatest share of
resources (40% to 45%) to programs that use cognitive-behavioral
interventions to target criminal thinking, criminal lifestyles, or both.300
Next, the model recommends allocating the second largest share (25% to
30%) to treating offenders with “clinical destabilizers,” including
substance abuse and mental health disorders.301 Finally, the model would
allocate the third largest share (15% to 20%) of treatment resources to
(describing the rationale for matching risk-need configurations to appropriate programming and
the process used to develop individual program-group assignment and classification criteria for
programs).
295. See Stephanie A. Ainsworth & Faye S. Taxman, Creating Simulation Parameter Inputs
with Existing Data Sources: Estimating Offender Risks, Needs, and Recidivism, in SIMULATION
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM, supra note 249, at 115, 115–19; id. at 117 tbl.5.1 (listing the
static risk factors, dynamic criminogenic risks, criminally relevant destabilizers, and lifestyle
factors (stabilizers, destabilizers) included in the simulation tool); Faye S. Taxman et al., The
Empirical Basis for the RNR Model with an Updated RNR Conceptual Framework, in
SIMULATION STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM, supra note 249, at 73, 73–106 (prioritizing
offender needs based on their direct impact on recidivism and the clinical relevance of noncriminogenic factors).
296. These datasets, each created by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, included the Survey
of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2004; the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails,
2002; the State Court Processing Statistics; and the Recidivism of Inmates Released in 1994. See
Ainsworth & Taxman, supra note 295, at 120; see also id. at 120–40 (describing the assumptions
and data elements of the RNR Simulation Tool and Model).
297. Taxman et al., supra note 249, at 297.
298. See id.; see Avinash Bhati et al., RNR Simulation Tool: A Synthetic Datasets and Its
Uses for Policy Simulations, in SIMULATION STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM, supra note 249,
at 197, 198–220 (describing a synthetic dataset development and re-weighting methodology that
will allow small and under-resourced jurisdictions or agencies to generate a synthetic dataset that
can be analyzed as if it were a localized data collection effort).
299. Taxman et al., supra note 249, at 298; see Ainsworth & Taxman, supra note 295.
300. See Taxman et al., supra note 249, at 298.
301. See id.
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improve social and interpersonal stability with programs involving anger
management, services to increase education and employment
opportunities, and other initiatives.302 Programming types requiring
fewer resources include those for substance dependence (not abuse), life
skills programs, and absolute punishment.303
Researchers have also used this simulation tool to identify the
proportion of correctional populations at each risk level that are
recommended for each RNR program type.304 Overall, the simulation tool
recommends that a high percentage of total offenders in each correctional
modality (prison, jail, community corrections) should receive treatment
for substance abuse or mental disorders (25% to 28%).305 Disaggregated
by risk level, however, it only recommends that a small percentage (3%
to 5%) of high-risk offenders in each modality receive this treatment.306
A much higher percentage of moderate-risk offenders is recommended
for substance abuse or mental health treatment: 40% of moderate-risk
prisoners,307 31% of jail inmates,308 and 36% of those on community
supervision.309
The simulation model recommends that the highest percentage of
offenders should receive cognitive-behavioral treatment for criminal
thinking and lifestyle—overall, among high-risk offenders, and among
moderate-risk offenders. On a systems level, the model recommends that
43% of prisoners, and 42% of jail inmates and individuals on community
supervision, should receive cognitive-behavioral treatment for criminal
thinking and lifestyle.310 Crucially, it recommends that the vast majority
(75%) of high-risk offenders in each modality receive this intervention.311
Substantial percentages of moderate-risk offenders are recommended for
treatment for criminal thinking and lifestyle: 35% of moderate-risk
prisoners,312 42% of jail inmates,313 and 38% of those on community
supervision.314 It is also useful to remember that offenders with mental
illness appear to have criminal cognition levels at or above those of

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 299 tbls.11.1–11.3.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 299 tbl.11.1.
Id. at 299 tbl.11.2.
Id. at 299 tbl.11.3.
See id. at 299 tbls.11.1–11.3.
See id.
Id. at 299 tbl.11.1.
Id. at 299 tbl.11.2.
Id. at 299 tbl.11.3.
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general offenders,315 and that the extent to which treatment of mental
illness facilitates the treatment of criminogenic needs is still unclear.316
Currently, the programming resources allocated to treating major
criminogenic needs in correctional settings are woefully inadequate.317
Although the greatest rehabilitative needs are for interventions that target
criminal cognitions and lifestyles, these are the least available types of
programming.318 There is often no direct funding for these programs, and
few correctional agencies regularly offer them.319 Given the importance
of these criminogenic needs and their frequency among the offending
population,320 perhaps criminal justice institutions should prioritize
investing in treatment programs that address these needs (depending on
the relative cost and effectiveness of these programs), as well as proper
risk assessment instruments and sorting procedures to ensure that
individuals at higher risk of recidivism are prioritized for services.321
2. Proper Goals of Correctional Treatment
This Article has assessed the propriety of maintaining specialized
justice programs for offenders with serious mental illness in a
correctional system whose aim in providing mental health services—
beyond satisfying constitutional obligations322—is to maximize public
safety. However, it is necessary to ask whether public safety is the right
goal in this context, or whether it should be one of several aims to pursue.
On one hand, as Professor Kirk Heilbrun and colleagues have observed,
“[s]ervices to justice-involved individuals are almost entirely publicly
funded, and society has a substantial interest in supporting rehabilitative

315. See supra notes 255–59 and accompanying text.
316. See supra Subsections III.A.2, IV.A.1–2.
317. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 321 (“It is almost nonexistent to find the
MDO [mentally disordered offender] undergoing treatment that targets, for example, procriminal
attitudes and associates. Even targeting the criminogenic need of substance abuse is relatively
rare.”). Inadequate programs also exist for treating substance abuse, with the result that most
offenders with substance abuse disorder do not receive these services. See Taxman et al., supra
note 249, at 292–93.
318. See Taxman, supra note 171, at 38.
319. Taxman et al., supra note 249, at 292–93.
320. See supra notes 254, 309–13 and accompanying text.
321. In addition, to the extent that a jurisdiction chooses to allocate resources to address a
responsivity barrier, mental illness may not be the most appropriate factor to address. See Cohen
& Whetzel, supra note 164, at 12–13, 14 tbl.1 (finding, in a descriptive analysis of the presence
of responsivity factors for 19,753 offenders placed on federal supervision over a four-month
period, that inadequate transportation was a more commonly flagged responsivity obstacle than
mental illness for high-risk (22% versus 18%) and moderate-risk (17% versus 12%) offenders,
yet many more resources were allocated to mental health than to transportation).
322. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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services that reduce the risk of further offending.”323 A reduced
likelihood of reoffending likely signals improved individual stability.324
On the other hand, it is clear that this population has dire health needs
that require more than a minimal level of attention to allow for recovery,
personal flourishing, and the avoidance of suffering.325 Thus, some have
argued that the clinical needs of all offenders must be addressed for
humanitarian reasons.326
An alternative argument, which might be more appealing to
policymakers in a tight fiscal climate,327 would involve concern for the
overall societal cost exacted by offenders with serious mental illness.
These individuals tend to be large consumers of public health resources,
including emergency and inpatient psychiatric services.328 Criminal
justice programs that address mental health needs—even when they do
not reduce recidivism—may be cost-effective when they reduce the use
of these other services.329 For instance, Professors Skeem and Sarah M.
Manchak found, in a matched sample of 367 probationers with serious
mental illness who were followed for two years, that specialty probation
was cost-effective compared with traditional probation (average cost per
probationer of approximately $15,000 versus $20,000, respectively),
largely through reduced expenditures on emergency and inpatient
psychiatric services.330 As Skeem and colleagues later observed, “the
323. Heilbrun et al., supra note 270, at 273.
324. See ROTTER & CARR, supra note 207, at 1.
325. SAMHSA defines “recovery” from mental disorder or substance abuse disorder as “[a]
process of change through which individuals improve their health and wellness, live a selfdirected life, and strive to reach their full potential.” SAMHSA’s Working Definition of Recovery
Updated, SAMHSA BLOG (Mar. 23, 2012), https://blog.samhsa.gov/2012/03/23/defintion-ofrecovery-updated/#.W2oCOVVKjIU [https://perma.cc/CS82-8CQH]. This conception of
recovery includes four main dimensions, including health, a stable and safe home, the ability to
lead a purposeful life, and being in “relationships and social networks that provide support,
friendship, love, and hope.” Id.
326. See BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 128, at 177–78; Skeem et al., supra note 100, at
918 (“The target population has pressing behavioral health needs. If policy goals reach beyond
reducing recidivism—as we believe they should—then strict adherence to the risk principle may
have costs.”).
327. See ROTTER & CARR, supra note 207, at 1 (“Decreased criminal recidivism, particularly
resulting from new crimes with new victims, is the measure most consistently desired by
programs, policymakers, and funding agencies for justice-involved individuals with mental
illness. This one measure captures both improved client stability and public safety, while
providing support for the promised decreased jail-day cost savings required to sustain continued
financial resources.”).
328. See Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal
Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 15, 19, 28 (2012) (discussing research).
329. Skeem et al., supra note 100, at 918–19.
330. Id. at 918 (discussing Jennifer L. Skeem & Sarah M. Manchak, Does Specialty Mental
Health Probation “Fight Crime and Save Money”? A Cost-Benefit Analysis, Presentation at the
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results [of this study] raise the possibility that addressing clinical needs
could net large returns in other domains, even if symptom control rarely
translates into reduced recidivism.”331
However, the overall cost-effectiveness of such a return would depend
on whether the individuals in these specialized programs—of all
individuals with serious mental illness who could be receiving mental
health treatment and stabilization—are the ones most likely to exact the
highest cost on society if untreated. If not, then public health resources
should be used in a way that benefits persons who have not committed
criminal offenses. On the other hand, given that persons with serious
mental illness are often unwilling to identify a treatment need or accept
treatment, it is possible that the leveraging power of the criminal justice
system offers a useful, and perhaps necessary, way to supply and engage
individuals in treatment332 such that only through leveraging the justice
system can a net savings occur. If this is the case, then a strong utilitarian
argument exists for including broader societal costs in the cost-benefit
analysis of whether to invest in specialized criminal justice programs for
offenders with mental illness. Such consideration would be particularly
appropriate when considering specialized programs for higher risk
offenders with serious mental illness, a programmatic configuration that
strong evidence suggests would maximize public safety benefits.
CONCLUSION
Robust evidence demonstrates that offenders with serious mental
illness are driven by the same set of criminogenic needs that motivate
those without mental illness. Therefore, these offenders are more similar
to than different from the general offending population, and rehabilitative
strategies should be similar for both populations. Given deeply embedded
stigma and a long history of discrimination against individuals with
serious mental illness, specialized, segregated criminal justice programs
should not exist unless they are justified by a scientifically supportable
rationale. Such justifications are possible, but they are currently largely
unsupported by data. Much more research is needed on the relationship
of mental illness (and the treatment of mental illness) to the treatment of
criminogenic needs. In the meantime, correctional institutions should
focus on treating the criminogenic needs of higher risk individuals and

American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS) Annual Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico (Mar.
14–17, 2012)).
331. Id. (endnote omitted).
332. See Michael Allen, Round Pegs, Square Holes, 22 HEALTH AFF. 280, 280–81 (2003)
(debating the role that lack of insight into illness and coercion should play in provision of mental
health treatment).
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begin to take seriously their constitutional obligation to provide
reasonably adequate mental health care to all inmates in need.333
One consequence of the normalization realization should be to
highlight what should already have been apparent: The criminal justice
system should not and cannot be society’s primary source of mental
health care. The goals of the justice system—to punish and reduce
recidivism—are largely unserved by mental health care. Moreover, the
punitive and security focus of the criminal justice system makes the
system, and those who choose to serve in it, particularly ill-equipped to
render effective care.334 Instead, the justice system must be a secondary
stopgap, supplying the minimum amount of mental health care necessary
to meet constitutional obligations and permit the effective treatment of
criminogenic needs in higher risk offenders. The primary source of care
must reside in community mental health services, which are woefully
underfunded and in desperate need of resources and attention.

333. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
334. See HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19.

